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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Dynamic Adjustments of Cognitive Control in Healthy Aging:
A Diffusion Model Analysis
by
Andrew J. Aschenbrenner
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis, 2016
Professor David Balota, Chair
The control of attention over salient yet irrelevant information is a critical component of
goal-directed behavior. Compared to younger adults, older adults often produce larger
interference effects in tasks which tap selective attention, a deficit that has typically been viewed
as reflecting an age-related decline in attentional control processes. Interference in distinct,
attentionally demanding tasks has produced different influences on the characteristics of
underlying response time distributions leading to the assumption of different control mechanisms
operating across various paradigms. More recently, accumulating research has shown that the
magnitude of observed interference can be critically modulated by the congruency of the
immediately preceding trial, a phenomenon known as the congruency sequence effect (CSE).
This effect is thought to reflect the online modulation of control processes across adjacent trials.
Three specific questions regarding the nature of cross-trial effects in attentional control tasks
were addressed across three different experiments. First, what stimuli characteristics drive crosstrial changes in attentional control? Second, what component of cognitive processing is
responsible for such changes? Third, how do these processes change as a function of healthy
aging?
x

To address these questions, Experiment 1 tested younger and older adults on versions of
three attention tasks, Stroop, Simon and flanker, which were designed to eliminate common
confounds such as the exact repetition of stimuli across adjacent trials. The results revealed a
significant CSE was present in all tasks which was further moderated by age in two. Specifically,
the CSE was larger for older adults compared to younger in the Stroop task, but smaller in the
Simon task (and trending smaller in flanker). Furthermore, examination of the response time
distributions indicated the CSE in Stroop was due to changes in distributional skewing whereas
changes in Simon and flanker were better characterized by a simple shift.
Experiment 2 was modeled closely after Experiment 1 with the addition of a response
deadline procedure. This was implemented to increase the error rates in each task to better allow
for the application of computational modeling (i.e., using the diffusion model). The procedure
was successful in speeding up responses equally for each age group and also produced more
errors, especially for younger adults. Examination of diffusion model parameters showed
intriguing task dissociations such that the previous trial influenced both the non-decision time
and drift rate parameters of the diffusion model in Simon but influenced primarily drift rate in
both Stroop and flanker. These parameter changes were largely similar across younger and older
adults.
Experiment 3 was designed to further probe the characteristics of stimuli that prompt
cross-trial changes in control. Stroop stimuli were utilized that were either mostly congruent at
the item level (i.e., the word appeared in the corresponding color most of the time), mostly
incongruent (the word appeared in a non-corresponding color most of the time), or neutral (items
were 50% congruent), while keeping the overall list-wide congruency constant at 50%. This
manipulation (the item-specific proportion congruency effect: ISPC) has well-established effects
xi

on overall interference such that effects are smaller for the mostly incongruent items. This
experiment assessed whether the differential change in conflict would produce CSEs of varying
magnitude. This hypothesis was not supported as evidence was obtained for both a robust CSE
and ISPC which did not interact in either younger or older adults.
These results support the conclusion that the CSE reflects a very locally driven
mechanism which responds to any degree of response conflict regardless of its overall
magnitude. This adjustment process appears to decline with age as evidenced by the lower CSEs
for older adults in the Simon and flanker tasks. In contrast, in the Stroop task it is hypothesized
that a different cross-trial process may be operating, namely the priming of irrelevant processing
pathways which is only engaged when relevant and irrelevant dimensions are perceived as an
integrated whole.

xii

Introduction
The ability to select aspects of the environment for further processing while ignoring
highly salient yet irrelevant information is a critical component of goal-directed behavior.
Consider the following scenario as a motivating example. An older adult needs to take an aspirin
for a headache. The process to accomplish this involves (among other things) navigating to the
bathroom, opening the medicine cabinet, and selecting the appropriate medicine bottle. However,
within the cabinet there are likely other medicine bottles that one may utilize on a more regular
basis (for example, heart medication). The habitual response to reach for and take the (salient)
heart medicine bottle must be inhibited in order to take the correct pill. This inhibition process is
part of the attentional control system.
Attentional selection or attentional control is typically assessed by presenting participants
with stimuli that contain at least two pieces of information and measuring the difference in
response time (or accuracy) when the sources of information lead to the same response
(congruent trials) versus when they lead to different responses (incongruent trials). The degree to
which the conflicting information interferes with response output (i.e., the response time
difference between stimuli) is operationalized as an index of the demand for attentional control.
One of the most prominent attentional control paradigms is the Stroop task (Stroop,
1935). In this task, participants are shown color words printed in colored ink (e.g., the word RED
printed in blue ink) and are asked to name the color of the ink and ignore the word. Attentional
control is measured by directly contrasting relevant (color) information against irrelevant (word)
information within the same stimulus. When the conflicting information is well controlled, the
difference in response time between incongruent and congruent stimuli should be relatively small
compared to when the conflicting information is less controlled.
1

Declines in inhibitory function have long been proposed to underlie the processing
deficits that are observed in healthy aging (Hasher & Zacks, 1988). This proposition is supported
by studies that show interference in the classic Stroop color naming task increases with
advancing age (Bugg, DeLosh, Davalos, & Davis, 2007; Jackson & Balota, 2013; Spieler,
Balota, & Faust, 1996). However, there is evidence to suggest that age-related changes in control
are not universal and that some mechanisms remain relatively intact even in old age
(Aschenbrenner & Balota, 2015; Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007; Bugg, 2014b). Furthermore, it
is possible that these control processes are differentially brought online as a function of the
particular interference task that is used. For example, despite the studies cited above, significant
increases in Stroop interference have been not been consistently found in the literature after
controlling for general slowing (Verhaeghen & De Meersman, 1998). In contrast, deficits in
other interference paradigms have been found much more consistently. In particular, if one
considers the Simon task, age differences in interference effects appear quite robust (Castel,
Balota, Hutchison, Logan, & Yap, 2007; Proctor, Pick, Vu, & Anderson, 2005; van der Lubbe &
Verleger, 2002). Therefore, an important issue is to understand the precise nature of age-related
changes in attentional control processes and how the cognitive system might differentially adapt
to these changes as a function of specific task constraints.
First, in order to determine the locus of age-related changes in attentional control, it is
critical to have a model that describes how interference control occurs. For example, popular

2

models of Stroop performance utilize a dual pathway architecture in which relevant information
accumulates along one pathway and irrelevant information along the other. One of the most

Figure 1. Computational model of the Stroop task. Recreated from Cohen et al. (1990).

prominent of such models is the Cohen, Dunbar, and McClelland (1990) model (shown in Figure
1) which contains “color” nodes that are activated by color information and “word” nodes that
are activated by word information. Input to the two pathways is modulated by "task demand"
units that reflect the operation of attentional processes. A greater control of attention will reduce
the overall input to the word pathway. The activation from the nodes in each pathway then feeds
forward via hidden connection weights and accumulates in a response output node. Once
sufficient activation for a particular choice has accumulated, that response is executed. If the
3

word information is particularly strong and/or the task node is relatively weak (perhaps due to a
lapse in attentional control), the threshold for the word response will be exceeded before the
threshold for the color response, thereby causing the production of an incorrect response
(namely, reading the word instead of naming the color).
Another commonly used measure of attentional selection is the Simon task (Simon,
1969). In Simon-type tasks, responses to particular stimuli are mapped to a left or right response
button. For example, the letter “A” might be associated with “press the left key” and the letter
“X” with “press the right key”. The critical manipulation is the spatial location in which the
stimulus appears. An “A” that appears on the left side of the computer screen is congruent
because the spatial location and response location match (left side of the screen and left response
key). However, an “A” on the right would be incongruent because the spatial location and
response are opposite. As with Stroop, the standard finding is that responses to incongruent
stimuli are reliably slower than to congruent items, which reflects some degree of interference
from the irrelevant spatial information.
Once again appealing to a dual pathway architecture, one model of the Simon task by
Kornblum, Hasbroucq, and Osman (1990) also posits two processes. The first process involves
direct, automatic activation of the response associated with the spatial location of the stimulus.
For example, if a stimulus appears on the left side of the screen, the motor program for a “left”
response is pre-activated. At the same time, a controlled identification of the stimulus takes place
(e.g., is it the letter “A”, indicating to press the left button, or the letter “X” indicating to press
the right button). After complete identification, the output from the two processes is compared. If
they are identical, the preloaded motor response from the automatic process can be quickly
executed. However, if they don’t match (as in the case of incongruent stimuli) the original motor
4

program must be aborted (inhibited) and the correct motor program retrieved resulting in the
slowing that is observed for these items (see Figure 2).
A third popular measure of attentional control is the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen &
Eriksen, 1974). In this paradigm, stimuli consist of an array of characters (typically letters or
arrows) and participants are asked to identify the center target while ignoring the flanking
distracters. Importantly, the center and flanking characters can be congruent (e.g., “HHHHH”) or

Figure 2. Diagram of the Simon model. Recreated from Kornblum et al. (1990).

incongruent (e.g., “HHGHH”). Once again, responses are slower and less accurate to the
incongruent stimuli suggesting there is some degree of interference from the flanking stimuli. In
5

this task, interference is thought to be resolved via a narrowing of attention over time from a
“window” that encompasses the entire array to one that contains only the target letter. This
narrowing process can occur either continuously over time (White, Ratcliff, & Starns, 2011) or
all at once at a discrete time point (Hübner, Steinhauser, & Lehle, 2010). Diagrams of these two
models are shown in Figure 3. In contrast to the Stroop and Simon tasks, these models posit only
one process, the narrowing of attention, rather than accumulation or activation of two competing
sources of information. It should be noted that alternative accounts of flanker performance do
exist. For example, Cohen, Servan-Schreiber and Mcclelland (1992) present a model within a
parallel distributed processing framework that contains an attention module which can

Figure 3. Discrete and continuous models of the flanker task. The rectangle represents the
attentional "window".

6

selectively weight accumulation from the center (or indeed any) position making this model
functionally similar to the Stroop model.
Of course, the primary point from this discussion is that different types of interference are
resolved or controlled via different mechanisms or possibly even at different stages of
processing. Specifically, the Cohen et al. (1990) model of Stroop performance involves selective
processing of a particular attribute, the Kornblum et al. (1990) model of Simon performance
requires inhibition of the ipsilateral motor response and the White et al. (2011) model of the
flanker task posits a gradually narrowing attentional window to include only the center target.
Differences in interference control posited by these models have found support from
detailed examination of how interference effects change across the response time distribution. A
common way to examine this is to calculate the interference effect (e.g., incongruent RT –
congruent RT) at increasing percentiles of the RT distribution. In the Stroop task, the wellestablished pattern is for interference to become larger across percentiles (Heathcote, Popiel, &
Mewhort, 1991; Pratte, Rouder, Morey, & Feng, 2010). This pattern is consistent with evidence
accumulation models in which color information accrues towards a response threshold but can be
partially “contaminated” by information from the word dimension which decreases overall
accumulation for incongruent items (Spieler et al. 2000). The geometry of these models naturally
predicts a larger interference effect at slower rates of accumulation. In contrast, interference in
the Simon task typically decreases as RTs become longer, at least for younger adults, which is
consistent with early conflict between stimulus and response outputs that is resolved via
continuous inhibition over a particular motor response (Pratte et al. 2010). The longer the
incorrect motor response is inhibited, the less it will interfere with the correct response output
(i.e., at the final step of the Kornblum et al. (1990) model), which produces the decreasing effect.
7

Figure 4 illustrates these differences graphically for younger adults by plotting delta plots
(interference effect over time) in the Stroop and Simon tasks. Interestingly, older adults do not
appear to consistently show the decreasing interference effect (e.g., Castel et al. 2007) which is
consistent with the hypothesis that older adults are less able to control the automatically activated
response.
In contrast to these well-established findings, interference dynamics in the flanker task
are a little less clear. Specifically, interference has been shown to be constant across the
distribution (Spieler, Balota, & Faust, 2000; Zeischka, Coomans, Deroost, Vandenbossche, &
Soetens, 2011) or to increase in a manner similar to the Stroop task (Burle, Spieser, Servant, &
Hasbroucq, 2014; Ridderinkhof, Scheres, Oosterlaan, & Sergeant, 2005). The differing

Figure 4. Delta plots of the Stroop and Simon effects. Taken from Pratte et al. (2010).
8

distributional signatures may depend in part on the type of stimuli that is used (letters or arrows).
At least when using letter stimuli with younger adults the typical pattern is a pure shift in
interference (i.e., interference is constant over time, see Spieler et al. 2000). Spieler et al. (2000)
presented simulations of the effect and suggested that a shift is consistent with decreased
response thresholds for congruent stimuli.
The critical point from these distributional differences, as well as the model-derived
inferences, is to reinforce the notion that interference generated by various types of stimuli may
be resolved via different mechanisms or possibly at different stages during processing. As further
evidence for the independence of these interference effects, Simon and Berbaum (1990) directly
contrasted Stroop and Simon interference by using Stroop stimuli with the color responses
mapped to left or right keys. Specifically, the color red might be mapped to the left button and
the color green to the right button. The stimuli were then presented on the left or right side of the
screen. Thus, on each trial both Stroop interference (color vs. word) and Simon interference
(spatial location vs. response key) were present. The critical finding was that both types of
interference yielded statistically reliable main effects but did not interact. Therefore, using
additive factors logic, the authors concluded that Stroop and Simon interference manifest at
different processing stages1.
Returning now to the influence of healthy aging, recall that the reliability of age
differences appears to vary across these different paradigms. Take for example the interesting
case of the Simon task. Not only are age deficits more consistently found in this task compared
1

Of course, one must be cautious in making strong claims about additivity based solely on mean RTs because both
serial and parallel / interactive models can both produce additive effects on mean RT (cf. McClelland, 1979) and
only detailed analyses of RT distributions can truly discriminate among them (Roberts & Sternberg, 1993).
However, these results remain as compelling support for differential contributions to interference control at least in
these two tasks.

9

to the Stroop task, as described previously, but the distributional signature is qualitatively
different as well (decreasing interference effect over time for younger adults and increasing
effects for older). What can be causing these cross-task differences in apparent age deficits? One
obvious possibility is that certain inhibition mechanisms are more heavily influenced by age than
others. In particular, perhaps the interference between stimulus and response in the Simon task is
a more primitive mechanism, or there are differences in the speed with which irrelevant
responses are activated and inhibited across age, and thus demands on inhibitory control are
greater in Simon than in the Stroop task.
A second, and more interesting, possibility is that additional, task specific processes are
brought online in certain tasks that can mask or reduce age differences in interference at least
under certain conditions. One such potential mechanism is dynamic, trial by trial adjustments in
overall control reflected by differences in interference produced by the conditions of preceding
trials. For example, using a Stroop paradigm, Aschenbrenner and Balota (2015) showed that
differences in interference as a function of age were critically modulated by the congruency of
the immediately preceding trial as well as working memory capacity. That is, age effects were
relatively small (albeit still significant) following incongruent trials but exaggerated following
congruent trials. This effect was particularly strong for individuals low in working memory span.
It has been argued that such cross-trial changes in interference reflect continuous updating of
abstract control settings and importantly, it is possible that such trial by trial fluctuation in
attentional control (as opposed to global inhibition mechanisms) may therefore decline as a
function of age. This may in turn contaminate mean estimates of overall interference. The
possibility that changes in dynamic adjustments in control processes contribute to deficits in
attentional control is examined next.
10

Dynamic adjustments of control
It is clear that there are variations in the efficiency of control processes within an
individual across trials within a task and one might assume that there is simply greater variability
in control in older as compared to younger adults (West, 1999). However, it is equally possible
that control is dynamically and systematically altered on a trial by trial basis as opposed to
varying randomly over time. Indeed, such controlled adjustments might in fact be strategic and
differ by age. Specifically, rather than attempting to maintain a high degree of control throughout
an entire task, an operation that would be cognitively and metabolically demanding, it is possible
that older adults may allow control to wax and wane based on the level of perceived conflict on a
given trial. Thus, if numerous “easy” trials are perceived in a row, older adults may allow control
to relax slightly thereby reducing overall demands on the system. When a high degree of conflict
is experienced, control can be locally adjusted in preparation for future conflict.

11

A popular behavioral technique for examining adjustments in control is the Gratton effect
(Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992), also known as the “congruency sequence effect” (CSE). The
CSE is the finding that interference on trial N is smaller when trial N-1 was incongruent
compared to when Trial N-1 was congruent. This pattern is illustrated graphically in Figure 5. In
the Figure, previous trial congruency is displayed on the horizontal axis. The red and blue lines
represent incongruent and congruent items respectively. As shown, responses are faster when the
congruency repeats across subsequent trials which leads to the reduction in interference observed
after incongruent trials. This phenomenon typically holds in both RTs and error rates and has
been found across numerous interference tasks.
Due to its ubiquity, many theoretical mechanisms have been put forth to accommodate
the CSE. Most prominently, the conflict monitoring hypothesis (Botvinick, Braver, Barch,
Carter, & Cohen, 2001) proposes that the conflict arising from the joint activation of mutually

Figure 5. Graphical illustration of the congruency sequence effect (CSE).
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inhibitory representations or responses is detected by the anterior cingulate cortex. The
magnitude of that interference serves as a signal that is then sent to prefrontal control regions
which implement an increase in top-down control over the conflicting dimension (e.g., word
information in the Stroop task). This nicely accommodates the CSE because control should be
stronger following a conflicting (incongruent) stimulus which in turn reduces the interference on
subsequent trials. Such interpretations have been further supported by work from neuroimaging
studies which implicate a key role of the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex in the aforementioned effects (Kerns, 2004).
Although the conflict monitoring account has received the most attention in the literature,
several competing theories have also been proposed that directly challenge the need for a
dedicated conflict detection system. One such explanation appeals to a learning system that
determines the optimal time to respond in order to maximize response speed while minimizing
errors. Such a mechanism has been implemented in several formal models including the
Adaptation to the Statistics of the Environment model (ASE: Kinoshita, Forster, & Mozer, 2008)
and the temporal learning hypothesis (Schmidt, 2013b). Although these models were originally
developed to account for list-wide (as opposed to trial by trial) effects, the important argument is
that stimuli carry information relevant to when best to respond and this temporal information can
be utilized on subsequent trials. Specifically, according to the Schmidt (2013b) model,
participants encode that a particular item on trial N-1 was difficult and thus on trial N prepare to
respond relatively late. “Preparing to respond” involves implementing a within trial change in
response thresholds. Specifically, one can “prepare” to respond relatively late by selectively
lowering the response boundary after a set amount of time has passed and one can “prepare” to
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respond early by having initially low thresholds than are then increased after a set amount of
time.
This model is illustrated in Figure 6. The top panel of the figure shows performance when
the preceding trial was congruent. Here, response thresholds are lowered relatively early and
then returned to baseline after a period of time. Since response evidence accumulates more
quickly on congruent trials than on incongruent trials, such a drop in thresholds will affect only

Figure 6. The temporal learning model. Adapted from Schmidt (2013b). The dashed line is
the baseline threshold, the solid line is adjusted threshold based on the previous trial. The red
line represents activation on congruent stimuli and the blue line is activation on incongruent
stimuli.
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congruent stimuli and not incongruent items (because the threshold will have returned to baseline
before sufficient “incongruent” evidence would have accumulated). Thus, congruent-congruent
sequences will be relatively fast and congruent-incongruent sequences will be relatively slow. In
contrast, the bottom panel shows performance from when the previous trial was incongruent.
Now response thresholds are kept at baseline early in the trial and then dropped after a period of
time has passed. In this scenario, congruent trials will not be affected, since they will have
surpassed threshold before that threshold is lowered and incongruent-incongruent sequences will
be relatively fast. The combination of fast congruent-congruent sequences and fast incongruentincongruent sequences directly leads to reduced interference following incongruent trials, hence
producing the CSE. Although somewhat complex, the critical point is that temporal learning
models rely on the rapid re-adjustments of response thresholds as the key mechanism to explain
cross trial response dynamics.
It is important to note that the “difficulty” of the previous trial which produces the change
in thresholds in the temporal learning model does not have to be tied to congruency or response
conflict. For example, another interpretation of the CSE appeals to contingency learning
mechanisms. That is, participants adjust responses based on previous trial contingency rather
than congruency. This is problematic for the conflict monitoring account because most
experimental designs present an equal number of stimuli within each congruency cell which
produces a contingency confound. For example, in a four color Stroop paradigm, if there are 9
congruent trials of a certain color there would be 3 presentations of that particular word within
each of the other 3 colors leading to 9 congruent trials and 9 incongruent trials. However, when
this approach is taken, the irrelevant dimension predicts the correct response (e.g., the word
information predicts the color response) more often than would be expected based on chance. In
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other words, congruency is confounded with contingency because congruent items have high
contingency (the word itself is often the correct answer) and incongruent items have low
contingency. The cognitive system could then utilize that contingency information to change
response dynamics on the following trial, possibly via temporal learning as explained above
(Schmidt, 2013a). In other words, if the trial that was just presented was high in contingency, the
participant may drop their thresholds relatively early, just as if the previous trial was congruent
(because contingency and congruency are perfectly confounded).
Indeed, Schmidt and De Houwer (2011) showed that when this contingency bias was
experimentally eliminated, the CSE is no longer found. However, it is important to note that in
order to eliminate the contingency issue, these authors created an item specific proportion
congruency confound. Specifically, all of their items were mostly incongruent which could
influence the CSE (or lack thereof) in ways that are as yet unknown. Indeed, a follow up study
provided evidence that after controlling for contingencies using a method that precluded item
specific congruency confounds, a robust CSE was still obtained (Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem,
Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014a). The important point here is that item contingencies can at least
partially drive cross-trial changes; thus, if one wants to make an argument about conflict
adjustment per se then such contingency confounds (which lie outside the realm of conflict
adaptation) must be eliminated.
In contrast to the preceding theories, another account of the CSE posits a more passive
mechanism underlying attentional control adjustments. Specifically, Aschenbrenner and Balota
(2015) argued the CSE in the Stroop task results from the differential priming of processing
pathways from trial to trial. Specifically, on a congruent Stroop stimulus on trial N, the word
dimension provides useful information that can be utilized for making the correct response,
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which primes the system to use that information again on subsequent trials. Thus, the word
pathway will receive relatively more activation on the following trial (N+1). If trial N+1 is also a
congruent trial, responses will then be speeded because the word dimension again contributes
useful information towards the correct response, making congruent-congruent sequences
relatively fast. However, if N+1 is incongruent, there is now additional activation along the
irrelevant word pathway (which no longer contributes useful information) that must be
controlled. This extra demand on control then results in relatively slower responses for
congruent-incongruent sequences.
Similarly, if trial N was incongruent the color pathway is now primed because color was
the selected dimension for that trial. This priming would benefit an incongruent trial on N + 1,
where color again needs to be selected for processing, and to a certain extent slow processing for
a congruent trial on N + 1 because the word pathway could have contributed useful information
towards the correct response. Again, fast congruent-congruent and fast incongruent-incongruent
sequences lead directly to a congruency sequence effect.
This explanation appears similar to the conflict monitoring account but places a key role
on pathway utility rather than response conflict per se, which is a subtle but important
distinction. In order to provide further support for the pathway priming account, Aschenbrenner
and Balota present analyses of the CSE in conjunction with several individual difference
measures (age and working memory capacity). One might expect that the ability to up regulate
control (i.e., conflict adaptation) as a function of the previous trial would decrease with age and
working memory. Interestingly, Aschenbrenner and Balota found precisely the opposite pattern
of effects, specifically the magnitude of the CSE both increased with age and decreased with
working memory span. Furthermore, they showed this difference in the CSE was driven to a
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large extent by response changes following congruent stimuli with relatively small differences
occurring after incongruent stimuli. Such a finding appears inconsistent with conflict adaptation
but falls naturally from the pathway priming model. Specifically, individuals with compromised
attentional control systems (in this case older adults with relatively low working memory
capacity) have difficulty controlling the increased activation produced by the cross-trial priming.
The key point from this model-based review is that the CSE is thought to provide an
important window into online adjustments in attentional control. Several theoretical models have
been developed which all can account for the primary finding, which is that interference effects
are smaller following incongruent trials relative to following congruent trials (see Figure 5).
However, these models each vary in the specific mechanisms that are invoked to create such
cross-trial differences and also differ in their ability to accommodate individual differences in the
CSE magnitude. Furthermore, it is possible that different mechanisms of the CSE are utilized
across different interference tasks, which is why the task models outlined in the introduction are
so critical.
Thus, one of the primary goals of this dissertation is to adjudicate among extant models
of the CSE, specifically the conflicting monitoring hypothesis, the temporal learning hypothesis,
and the pathway priming model. In order to rigorously distinguish among them, it is critical to
reiterate a few key points about unembellished forms of each model. The conflict monitoring
accounts suggests that the CSE arises from top-down increases in control induced by the
presence or absence of response conflict. Temporal learning suggests that cross-trial changes are
due to adjustments in response thresholds induced by some aspect of the preceding trial (that
aspect could be contingencies, overall difficulty or even conflict), whereas contingency learning
specifically states that it is the cross-trial contingences that produce such changes in thresholds.
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Finally, pathway priming suggests that the utility of a given processing pathway (or less
abstractly, the utility of the irrelevant dimension) differentially primes processing of that
dimension on subsequent trials.
It is clear from the motivation of these contrasting accounts that these models differ with
regards to what is the trigger that induces changes in response dynamics across trials, be it
conflict, contingencies, or pathway utility. Therefore, the standard approach is to attempt to
eliminate particular confounds and see whether the standard conflict monitoring interpretation
still holds. As discussed above, sometimes the CSE remains after controlling for a certain
confound and sometimes it is eliminated, at least at the level of mean RT (see Schmidt, 2013a for
a recent review).
However, theories of the CSE also differ in their predictions regarding the specific
components of processing that are affected as a function of the preceding trial. Unfortunately,
making inferences about underlying components of processing is problematic when only mean
RTs are examined, which is the most common approach in the field. In fact, no study has
examined issues of dynamic control mechanisms using a model of cognitive processing, such as
the diffusion model, that specifically allows for inferences to be made on underlying components
of processing. As will be discussed below, the models of the CSE make different predictions
regarding diffusion model parameters and thus, they can be further dissociated using this type of
analysis.
The Diffusion Model
One of the most popular model of cognitive processing is the diffusion model (Ratcliff,
1978), which is a specific implementation of a broad class of information accumulation models.
The diffusion model (depicted in Figure 7) assumes that evidence for a particular response is
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continually sampled from the environment and accumulated toward a response threshold. Once a
given threshold (a) has been surpassed, the response associated with that boundary is executed.
This parameter indicates the amount of evidence that is required before that response is made
and is typically interpreted as indexing response caution. Evidence begins accumulating in the
model at the starting point (z) which is drawn from a uniform distribution of a certain width
indexed by a variability parameter (sz). Non-decision time (t0) indexes the amount of time taken
for processes external to the decision such as stimulus encoding and motor execution. This
parameter is also uniformly distributed from trial to trial. Finally, the drift rate (v) is the rate at
which evidence is extracted from the environment and accumulated towards a threshold and has
an associated variability parameter eta (η).

Figure 7. Major parameters of the Ratcliff (1978) diffusion model.
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Within this framework, what predictions do the accounts of the CSE make with regards
to diffusion model parameters? Schmidt’s (2013b) temporal learning model can be cast in terms
of the diffusion model in a very straightforward manner and it clearly predicts changes in
response thresholds as a function of the previous trial. This maps onto the boundary separation
parameter of the diffusion model. Furthermore, the temporal learning model makes no
differential predictions across different tasks. Thus, the CSE should be produced via changes in
boundary separation in the Simon, Stroop and flanker paradigms.
In contrast, recall that the conflict monitoring hypothesis states that the presence of
conflict produces an increase in control over the conflicting dimension. This would predict the
effect of the preceding trial to manifest on whichever parameter indexes control in that task.
Importantly, defining the locus of control depends very heavily on the particular model of the
task, which again is why a careful delineation of models of the three tasks was so critical.
Specifically, in the Cohen et al. (1990) model of the Stroop task, incongruent stimuli contain a
mixture of color and word information and thus evidence accumulation towards the appropriate
color response boundary will be less rapid than if the color and word information were aligned.
Thus, when control is exerted over the word dimension, the “mixture” of evidence will contain
relatively little word information directly leading to faster accumulation. Put simply, control in
this model should manifest itself on the drift rate parameter which specifically indexes evidence
accumulation. Therefore, if the congruency of the previous trial prompts an increase in control,
this should also manifest on the drift rate in the Stroop task.
In contrast, according to the Kornblum model, the Simon task is thought to require
control over a particular motor response. That is, the stimulus is first identified and its motor
response code retrieved. If the automatic, spatially activated response code is incongruent, that
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response code must be inhibited. In the diffusion model framework, one might then expect
interference (and thus, the influence of the previous trial) to manifest on non-decision time, the
parameter that indexes response execution processes. This prediction has some support from
EEG studies which show that presentation of a stimulus produced initial activation of the
spatially corresponding region of motor cortex (De Jong, Liang, & Lauber, 1994). Of course
such a simple parameterization cannot account for the negative delta slope, that is a decreasing
interference effect across time, at least not without assuming effects on other parameters as well.
Because of this, one might argue that Simon interference should influence the drift rate as well.
Finally, detailed modeling work suggests that flanker interference can be directly
modeled using a parameter that indexes the perceptual information that feeds into the drift rate
(White et al., 2011) again predicting an influence of the previous trial on the drift rate. This
differs somewhat from the Spieler et al. (2000) modeling work that suggested the distributional
effects in flanker are best accommodated by a change in the boundary separation. Unfortunately,
comparisons across studies are somewhat limited by the fact that each used a unique set of
stimuli and responses. Specifically, Spieler et al. (2000) used letter stimuli (e.g., “HHKHH”) and
White et al. (2011) utilized arrows (<<><<). Thus, control can reasonably be predicted to
manifest either on the drift rate or boundary separation in this task. Regardless, the critical
prediction of the conflict monitoring account is that congruency of the previous trial and
congruency of the current trial should manifest on the same parameter within (but not necessarily
across) tasks.
Inferences about the locus of control have been derived from the models of each task
outlined in the introduction. Basing the predictions of the conflict monitoring account on those
models is somewhat dangerous as those models (as opposed to the conflict monitoring
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hypothesis itself) might be wrong. In other words, if an effect of the previous trial was not found
on drift rate in Stroop this could be due either to the conflict monitoring hypothesis being
incorrect or the predictions of the Cohen et al. (1990) model of Stroop performance being
incorrect. However, regardless of the specific, a priori model-based predictions, the conflict
account predicts that the previous trial effect should manifest on the same parameter(s) as the
current trial congruency effect. Thus, whatever parameter is found to empirically index control
should also show sensitivity to the conditions of the previous trial.
Finally, the pathway priming model was specifically developed to explain cross-trial
dynamics in the Stroop task. This account clearly predicts an influence on drift rate. This is
because if a congruent item on Trial N-1, for example, primes the color processing pathway,
more color information will be included in the evidence “mixture” on the current trial thereby
reducing overall drift. Such an account can be easily extended to the flanker paradigm. If
evidence accumulation is a mixture of central and exterior letters and the congruency of the
preceding trial prompts greater or reduced reliance on that irrelevant dimension, one would
expect previous trial effects to manifest on drift rate in this task as well. Extrapolating further to
the Simon task, if a congruent trial prompts reliance on the spatial dimension to determine a
response, one would expect the effect of the prior trial to again influence the drift rate.
Surprisingly, there has been relatively little application of the diffusion model to
understanding performance in tasks of interference control. One notable exception is King,
Donkin, Korb, and Egner (2012) who specifically contrasted a drift rate account with a response
threshold account with respect to context-specific proportion congruency effects (not the CSE)
using a flanker task and showed that across 4 datasets, the threshold account better
accommodated the data than a drift rate account lending credence to the notion that dynamic
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adjustments of thresholds may be a key mechanism underlying cognitive control. The analysis of
the CSE has not, to my knowledge, been explored with a general model-based analysis of
cognitive processing mechanisms. This is likely due to various experimental necessities such as
avoiding exact stimulus repetitions and contingency biases which rapidly increase the number of
responses required. Thus, more trials are needed overall to form stable distributions for each
response that are suitable for modeling which is one of the primary goals of the present
dissertation.
In sum, although extant theories are primarily concerned with what triggers adjustments
in control, they also make clear predictions about how that adjustment should be implemented.
Specifically, the conflict monitoring account proposes the CSE is due to tightening or relaxing of
control over the irrelevant dimension which should manifest on the drift rate (in Stroop or
flanker) or non-decision time and possibly drift rate (in Simon). These predictions were derived
from the models of each task outlined in the introduction. Temporal learning models suggest that
adjustments are entirely due to threshold changes, which are indexed with the boundary
separation parameter of the diffusion model regardless of the task. Finally, the pathway priming
account predicts that greater reliance is placed on the irrelevant dimension when determining the
correct response. This suggests an effect on the rate of information accumulation (i.e., the drift
rate) in all tasks. These model predictions are summarized in Table 1. It should be noted that the
most straightforward differences are between the temporal learning account (which predicts an
effect on boundary separation) and the other two models. Indeed, the conflict monitoring account
and pathway priming make very similar predictions regarding model parameters and thus these
latter two accounts will need to be separated using experimental manipulations.
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Table 1. Predictions of the three models regarding the locus of the previous trial effect in terms
of diffusion model parameters.
Task

Temporal Learning

Conflict Monitoring

Pathway Priming

Flanker

Boundary Separation

Drift Rate

Drift Rate

Simon

Boundary Separation

Non-decision time

Drift Rate

and / or drift rate
Stroop

Boundary Separation

Drift Rate

Drift Rate

Dynamic Control and Healthy Aging
With a firm understanding of extant theories of the CSE, one can now return to the
primary goal of evaluating whether healthy aging influences these dynamic adjustment
processes. To date, there has been some inconsistency in the literature regarding the CSE
magnitude across younger and older adults. Specifically, two studies have found statistically
equivalent CSEs in younger and older adults (Puccioni & Vallesi, 2012; West & Moore, 2005). It
should be noted, however, that West and Moore (2005) found a numerically larger effect in their
older adult sample and perhaps their relatively small sample size (12 in each age group)
precluded them from detecting a significant difference. Indeed, with a much larger sample size
(N = 435), Aschenbrenner and Balota (2015) have recently shown that the CSE significantly
increased with age in a standard Stroop color naming paradigm. As noted earlier, this increase
was especially pronounced for individuals with relatively low working memory capacity. Their
results are displayed in Figure 8, which shows the interference effect across age and working
memory separately for post-congruent and post-incongruent trials. These results suggest that
older adults show exaggerated sensitivity to previous trial characteristics. In particular, they
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show increased interference when the preceding trial was congruent at least when working
memory is relatively low.
It is worth highlighting the influence of working memory in modulating the CSE in the
Aschenbrenner and Balota (2015) study. Working memory is often associated with goal
maintenance (Kane & Engle, 2003), that is, maintaining the color naming task set across all the

Figure 8. Stroop interference as a function of age, working memory and previous trial
congruency. Recreated from Aschenbrenner and Balota (2015).
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trials within an experiment. According to Kane and Engle (2003), individuals with relatively low
working memory capacity are more prone to losing the task set and thus have slower RTs and /
or more errors. In the context of Aschenbrenner and Balota’s results, individuals with low
working memory showed the biggest CSE suggesting that perhaps those individuals rely more
heavily on local adjustments in control because proactive control processes are relatively
compromised. However, an alternative possibility put forth by those authors is that older adults
(and those with low working memory in particular) are less able to control cross-trial pathway
priming. That is, on a congruent stimulus the word pathway carries some utility in reaching the
correct response. Thus, on a subsequent trial the word pathway is already primed which will
benefit a congruent trial but heavily impair responses to incongruent trials leading to an
exaggerated CSE. Unfortunately, studies with younger adults have found mixed evidence for a
relationship between the CSE and working memory (Hutchison, 2011; Keye, Wilhelm,
Oberauer, & van Ravenzwaaij, 2009; Meier & Kane, 2013; Unsworth, Redick, Spillers, &
Brewer, 2012) so its influence may be highly task specific and group dependent.
In any case, the pathway priming model can readily accommodate larger CSEs in older
adults, due to the proposed lessened ability to control cross-trial priming. A critical question then
is how the other models fare in explaining this same phenomenon. As already discussed, an
intact or larger conflict adaption effect in older adults is surprising in light of conflict monitoring
and the frontal aging hypothesis (West, 1996) which posits that prefrontal brain regions decline
earlier with age than other areas. Assuming that the prefrontal cortex is critical in modulating top
down control, it would be expected that older adults should show reduced conflict adaptation
effects, a pattern that has clearly not been found in the literature, although as mentioned, this
may depend critically on working memory capacity (Aschenbrenner & Balota, 2015). In a
27

similar vein, to accommodate larger effects with age, the temporal learning model would have to
predict that older adults make larger adjustments to their response thresholds. However, this
seems to be challenged by extensive work using evidence accumulation models in older adults
which has suggested that older adults are either extremely unwilling (Starns & Ratcliff, 2010) or,
due to less intact white matter tracts, structurally unable (Forstmann et al., 2011) to make such
adjustments, even in the most extreme of circumstances (e.g., when explicitly instructed to do
so).
Thus, these initial results regarding age effects in the CSE appear to be most consistent
with predictions from the pathway priming model. However, the studies designed to address this
issue have had some limitations that are critical to note. First, all three studies specifically
designed to examine the CSE as a function of age (Aschenbrenner & Balota, 2015; Puccioni &
Vallesi, 2012; West & Moore, 2005) used variants of the Stroop task. It is possible that
characteristics of the Stroop task make it possible for older adults to dynamically adjust control,
even in the face of comprised control regions (e.g., prefrontal cortex). For example, each study
utilized a four color design with equal numbers of congruent and incongruent stimuli. As
mentioned above, this induces a contingency bias such that the irrelevant dimension predicts the
correct response more often than would be expected by chance. It is possible that older adults are
overly sensitive to these cross-trial contingencies leading them to employ a learning strategy
rather than a modulation of control triggered by conflict. It has already been shown that older
adults are capable of employing item specific, reactive control strategies in the Stroop paradigm
(Bugg, 2014b), and thus it is critical to disentangle the contribution of contingency vs.
congruency to the CSE in older adults.
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Furthermore, the previous studies that have investigated the CSE in both young and older
adults relied on mean RTs and it is possible that control processes manifest on different latent
parameters in the diffusion model in older adults compared to younger participants which might
exaggerate differences between age groups when only means are examined. Work by Ratcliff
and colleagues (Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2004; Ratcliff, Thapar, & Mckoon, 2010) applying
the diffusion model to performance on basic cognitive tasks such as number discrimination,
lexical decision and recognition memory suggests that aging influences boundary separation and
non-decision time, but drift rate remains fairly comparable (but see Spaniol, Madden, & Voss,
2006). In contrast, differences in general intelligence for the same age groups across the same
tasks appear to influence the drift rate.
It is unknown whether Stroop or Simon interference manifests differently within the
diffusion model framework as a function of age. However, several hypotheses are warranted.
First, based on past modeling work (Spieler et al., 2000) an interference effect on drift rate in
Stroop can be expected. In addition, because older adults often exhibit greater interference than
younger adults, it can be inferred that their drift rates will also be lower, in contrast to the
standard perceptual and memory based tasks favored by Ratcliff and colleagues. Due to the
geometry of the diffusion model, equal changes in drift rate will have larger effects on RT when
drift rate is at the lower end of the scale. Thus, it is possible that a smaller adjustment in drift rate
(compromised conflict adaptation) in older adults yields larger effects on mean RT simply
because they are experiencing more conflict (i.e. have lower drift rates) to begin with. In other
words, supposed “intact” conflict adaptation effects in older adults may simply be due to scaling
effects. Aschenbrenner and Balota (2015) addressed this issue by using random slopes for the
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congruency effect in a mixed effects model but a better approach is to utilize a full processing
model for the particular task (e.g., the diffusion model).
In summary, there is variability in the consistency of age differences in attentional control
across various interference paradigms. It is possible that this is due to changes in dynamic
adjustments in control processes. At least 3 models of the CSE (a reflection of dynamic control)
have been developed which make different predictions with regards to a) the trigger that initiates
a cross-trial change, b) how that change is implemented within the cognitive system across tasks
and c) how changes in the CSE with respect to individual differences can be accommodated.
The Present Study
This review of the literature has led to several alternative accounts of how attention
dynamically changes across trials. However, there are several limitations to the studies
conducted thus far. First, the vast majority have been subject to confounding variables to a
certain degree, particularly the presence of response contingencies. Furthermore, no study has
directly compared adaptation effects across multiple tasks in a well-controlled manner and none
have attempted to utilize a formal model of cognitive processing to inform theories about this
phenomenon. Finally, very few studies have examined how healthy aging influences these
processes and those that have used the Stroop task exclusively which limits the inferences about
the generality how these processes change with age.
With these limitations in mind, the present dissertation was designed to achieve several
inter-related goals. First, given the theoretical importance of dynamic adjustments in control to
our understanding of interference resolution, competing theories of the CSE (e.g., conflict
adaptation vs. temporal learning vs. pathway priming) were tested while controlling for critical
experimental confounds (e.g., repetition effects and contingency biases). Second, age-related
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differences in these processes were examined in order to further define the changes that occur in
inhibitory function during healthy aging.
Motivation for these goals can be framed within the context of three specific questions.
First, what triggers an adjustment in control processes (contingency or congruency)? This was
addressed by holding contingency constant and varying congruency in Experiments 1 and 2, and
by jointly manipulating contingency and congruency in Experiment 3. Second, how is this
adjustment implemented within a formal model of cognitive processing (changes in evidence
accumulation, response threshold or non-decision time)? Third, do older adults show differences
in the CSE and does this effect vary by task or other individual difference characteristics? It
could be argued that the pathway priming model predicts a larger CSE with age whereas both
conflict monitoring and temporal learning predict smaller CSEs with age.
An important aspect of this work, which allows for detailed inference about cross-trial
(and cross-task) influences, was the development of methods that carefully controlled for the
typical confounds in this area as well as minimized extraneous differences across tasks.
Specifically, a pool of four stimuli were developed for each of the primary tasks which were then
put into pairs. For example, items 1 and 2 were a pair as were items 3 and 4. The specific items
varied by task, items 1 and 2 might be red and blue in the Stroop task for example. One item of
each pair was the incongruent aspect of the stimulus for the other item. Continuing the same
example, items 1 and 2 together (red in blue ink) form an incongruent stimulus. When stimuli
were presented during the task, the pairs were alternated such that an item was selected using
items 1 and 2, and then 3 and 4 and finally back to items 1 and 2 again. Each item was mapped to
a key on the numeric keypad on the right hand side of standard keyboards. The keys were 2, 4, 6
and 8 allowing all responses to be made with one hand. Since item pairs alternated every trial,
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and there were only two items to a pair, contingency was maintained at 50% and response
repetitions were precluded as part of the design. These controls will have important implications
for the inferences that could be drawn from each experiment. It should be noted that this task
construction does lead to a somewhat limited stimulus set since on any given trial there are only
two possible response alternatives.
Experiment 1
The first experiment addressed age-related differences in the dynamic adjustment of
control across three attention tasks, Simon, Stroop and flanker. These particular tasks were
chosen based on the different control processes that are thought to be operating in each. Stimuli
were constructed to eliminate cross trial repetition and contingency biases which has confounded
much of the past work in this area, while also maximizing control over stimuli and responses to
afford a more direct comparison across tasks.
Method
Participants: Forty young adults were recruited from the undergraduate research pool at
Washington University in St. Louis who participated for course credit or for monetary

Table 1. Mean (SD) of age (in years), education (in years), AD8 and working memory span in
Experiment 1.
Younger
Older
N
40
36
Age
20.28 (2.16)
72 (4.54)
Education
13.38 (3.22)
17.22 (3.03)
AD8
NA
.72 (1.09)
CompSpan
17.08 (5.91)
14.03 (6.43)
Note: CompSpan = Total number of correct recall trials on the computation span task
and ranges from 0-21 with a higher score equal to better performance. The AD8 ranges
from 0-8 with a score of two or greater indicating likely presence of dementia.
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reimbursement. Thirty-six older adults were recruited from a volunteer pool maintained by
Volunteers for Health, which is a database of healthy, community dwelling seniors who are
interested in participating in research studies. Older adults were given monetary reimbursement
for their participation ($25). Demographic information collected on these individuals is provided
in Table 2.

Word

Location

Flanking
Letters

Table 2. Stimuli frequencies for each task in Experiment 1. The rows in each table are the
irrelevant dimension and the columns contain the relevant dimension.

C
S
H
K

ABOVE
BELOW
LEFT
RIGHT

RED
BLUE
GREEN
YELLOW

C
48
48

ABOVE
48
48

RED
48
48

Flanker Task
Central Letter
S
H
48
48
48
48
Simon Task
Word
BELOW
LEFT
48
48
48
48
Stroop Task
Color
BLUE
GREEN
48
48
48
48

K

48
48

RIGHT

48
48

YELLOW

48
48

Materials and Design: Variations of the three attention tasks were constructed that
carefully controlled for cross-trial repetition of stimuli and responses as well as eliminated the
contingency confound, as already described. Examples of congruent and incongruent trials for
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Figure 9. Examples of congruent and incongruent trials from each task in Experiments 1 and
2.

each task are shown in Figure 9 and the frequency of their presentations are shown in Table 3.
The flanker task consisted of sequences of 5 letters (e.g., HHHHH) that were formed from a pool
of 4 possible letters (C, S, H and K). Participants were instructed to indicate the central letter of
the stimulus using the numeric keypad (response keys: 2,4,6,8). This response orientation
allowed for four different responses to be made with a single hand. Stimuli were either congruent
(the stimulus consisted of 5 identical letters) or incongruent (the central letter was different from
the flanking 4 letters). Letters were placed into pairs such that for a given participant only two
letters were shown together. The letter pairs as well as their responses on the keypad were
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counterbalanced and rotated across subjects. Since only two letter combinations were used, all
responses were 50% contingent, that is the irrelevant dimension predicted the correct response
only 50% of the time. Similarly, the response pairs were alternated such that no response or
stimulus was repeated across adjacent trials. For example, on Trial N, the letters C and S might
be used but then on Trial N+1, the letters H and K were used and on Trial N + 2, C and S were
used again.
The Simon task consisted of spatial words (ABOVE, BELOW, LEFT, RIGHT) that were
printed either at the top, bottom, left or right of the computer screen. Participants were asked to
indicate the identity of the word and ignore the spatial location. Responses were again indicated
using the numeric keypad. The "2" key corresponded to "BELOW", 4 to "LEFT" and so forth to
induce the spatial conflict. As with flanker, words and locations were placed into pairs (e.g., the
word "LEFT" could appear on the left or the right side of the screen but never at the top or the
bottom). Stimuli alternated between the top vs. bottom and the left vs. right so that no location,
response or word was repeated across adjacent trials.
The Stroop task consisted of four color words (RED, BLUE, GREEN, YELLOW) which
were printed either in the same color ink (congruent trials) or an incongruent color (e.g., RED
printed in blue ink). Colors and words were split into pairs and counterbalanced and rotated
across subjects, controlling for stimulus and response repetitions. For both the flanker and Stroop
tasks, response keys (e.g., “4” = BLUE) were written on a "cue card" that was in full view of the
participant to refer to at any time during the task.
On each trial of each task, the following events were identical: 1) a fixation cross was
displayed for 500 ms, 2) a blank screen appeared for 200 ms, 3) the stimulus was shown for 5000
ms or until a response was made, 4) feedback was given for 1000 ms (“ERROR” for incorrect
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responses and “TOO SLOW” for a no response after 5000 ms, blank screen for correct
responses), 5) a screen that said “Press 5 to continue” was displayed until the participant pressed
the 5 key. This final step was done to insure the participant’s finger was equidistant from all
responses for each trial. The average time to self-initiate the next trial was less than 1 second for
each age group in each task (Simon, Young: Mean = 346 ms, SD = 1944, Old: Mean = 645, SD
= 1092; Stroop Young: Mean = 329, SD = 1385, Old: Mean = 647, SD = 1935; Flanker Young:
Mean = 332, SD = 1172, Old = 682, SD = 1296).
Each task was preceded by a practice block of 16 items. Additionally, the Stroop and
flanker tasks included a 20 item "learning" phase, during which single letters (for flanker) or
colored rectangles (for Stroop) were displayed and participants were instructed to press the
corresponding button. This was intended to help map the response keys to the individual stimuli.
The Simon task did not include a learning phase because the responses were already tied to a
spatial location. There were 384 test trials in each task which were split into 3 blocks.
Participants were instructed to take a break in between each block and also to take breaks within
a block if necessitated by fatigue or other considerations (e.g., eye strain). Speed was encouraged
throughout the task by instructing participants to respond as quickly as possible without
sacrificing accuracy.
After the administration of the three attention tasks, a computerized version of the
computation span task was given as a measure of working memory capacity (McCabe, Roediger,
McDaniel, Balota, & Hambrick, 2010). In this task, participants were presented with a
mathematical equation (e.g., is 7 + 4 = 10?) and were asked to indicate whether the answer was
correct or incorrect. Simultaneously, participants were required to remember the center digit for
later recall. The task increased in difficulty by first presenting a single trial before initiating
36

recall, followed by 2 equations then 3 and so on. Series of equations of different lengths (e.g., 1
equation, 2 equations etc.) were presented in blocks such that three "trials" of each length were
presented before proceeding to the next difficulty level. The task continued until the participant
incorrectly recalled at least one digit on two out of three trials within each block or until the
maximum length of 7 equations was reached. Twenty-one younger adults reached the maximum
number of equations whereas only 9 older adults did. This difference was significant based on a
regression analysis, β = 1.36, p = .008.
Procedure: Participants first reviewed the informed consent document and clarifications
were provided by the experimenter if necessary. A series of demographic questions (including
age and years of education) were answered. Older adults were also administered the AD8
(Galvin et al., 2005) which is a brief, 8 item questionnaire designed to detect early symptoms of
dementia. The three attention tasks were then given in counterbalanced order followed by the
computation span task. After the working memory assessment, participants were debriefed,
compensated and dismissed. The entire set of tasks took approximately 1.5 hours for younger
adults and 2 hours for the older group. There was variation in how quickly each individual
proceeded through the tasks and because of the relatively lengthy sessions 4 younger adults and
2 older adults were unable to complete the working memory task and 1 older adult was unable to
complete the flanker task. Given that examination of working memory in relation to the CSE was
ancillary to the primary results, these individuals were retained for all other analyses.
Results
In all of the present experiments, behavioral results were analyzed with linear mixed
effects (LME) models for mean response times using the lme4 package in R (Bates, Maechler,
Bolker, & Walker, 2015). Unfortunately, despite the well-established benefits of LME analyses
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over traditional techniques, one drawback to this method is that degrees of freedom cannot be
determined exactly, which poses problems for significance testing. There are, however, a number
of methods available to address this issue. First, the degrees of freedom can be approximated in a
variety of ways. The most common is the Satterthwaite approximation which has been shown to
keep the error rate at close to the nominal .05 level (Manor & Zucker, 2004). One can also
profile the likelihood function to generate confidence intervals or perform a likelihood ratio test
between a model that contains the critical effect and one that does not. When the number of
observations is large (as it is in the present study), these techniques all lead to the same
inferences and so for the sake of simplicity, significance based on p-values with approximate
degrees of freedom are presented.
Another issue with LME analyses concerns the normality of the model residuals. Given
that reaction time distributions are positively skewed, this also can pose problems for
significance testing with LME (see Balota, Aschenbrenner, & Yap, 2013). A different, yet
related issue, concerns group differences in overall speed. It is well-known that older adults are
slower than younger adults and this might exaggerate group differences in experimental effects
(i.e., the group by condition interaction: Faust, Balota, Spieler, & Ferraro, 1999; Salthouse,
1996). One method that can be used to address both of the latter two issues is to apply a nonlinear transformation to raw RT, such as the natural logarithm or taking the inverse of RT.
Because multiplicative effects become additive in log RT, if an age by condition interaction
persists in the transformed data it cannot be attributed to simple slowing. Furthermore, the
natural log transform helps to normalize skewed data. Thus, the primary results in these analyses
will be based on log-transformed RT.
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Of course, transformations are not without problems themselves as Balota et al. (2013)
have highlighted that the nonlinear transform required to normalize the data for an LME analysis
can artificially produce interactive relationships of previously additive variables. Thus, to insure
the presents results are not produced by such a confound, raw reaction times and z-scored
reaction times (which control for age-related slowing) of the critical analyses of each experiment
are provided in Appendix D. Importantly, the overall patterns remained consistent regardless of
the analytical strategy that was employed.
For each of the following analyses, age group (young vs. old), current trial congruency
(congruent vs. incongruent), previous trial congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and all the 2
and 3-way interactions were specified as fixed effects. Factors were coded as -0.5/ 0.5 contrasts
so that the main effects reflect the differences between condition means. Given the length of the
task, "trial number” (centered at the middle trial) and its interaction with group was included to
control for age differences in fatigue or practice / learning. In addition, log-transformed RT of
the previous trial was entered to control for the overall speed of the prior response as it has been
shown that speed of responses on prior trials can change current response dynamics (Kinoshita,
Mozer, & Forster, 2011). This complex analysis yielded a number of parameters in these models,
and although significance tests are provided for all parameters only a few effects will be
specifically highlighted which map onto the hypotheses of interest. Specifically, only the main
effect of congruency (is there an interference effect?), the age by congruency interaction (does
interference increase with age?), the congruency by previous congruency interaction (hereafter
referred to as the CSE) and the age by CSE interaction will be discussed.
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In order to avoid the undue influence of outliers, reaction times were screened in the
following manner. First, any RT faster than 200 ms was removed followed by any RT greater
than 3 standard deviations above or below the individual participants mean. Following this, any
trial that occurred immediately after a break or after an error was also removed. The percent of
each condition that was removed are displayed in Table 4. Although this trimming procedure
was relatively conservative, it was necessary in order to eliminate other explanations of the CSE
such as post-error slowing. The high proportion of trials removed is compensated somewhat by
the greater number of trials in these tasks overall. Finally, only correct RTs were examined so all
error trials were also removed for analysis of the reaction time.

Table 3. Proportion (SD) trials trimmed from each condition in each task
for each age group in Experiment 1.
Simon Task
Age Group
CC
CI
IC
II
Young
.03 (.03)
.04 (.02)
.07 (.05)
.08 (.06)
Old
.02 (.01)
.04 (.02)
.03 (.02)
.04 (.02)
Stroop Task
Age Group
CC
CI
IC
II
Young
.04 (.03)
.06 (.03)
.06 (.04)
.06 (.05)
Old
.02 (.02)
.04 (.03)
.04 (.02)
.05 (.02)
Flanker Task
Age Group
CC
CI
IC
II
Young
.05 (.03)
.06 (.04)
.06 (.04)
.07 (.04)
Old
.02 (.02)
.04 (.02)
.04 (.04)
.04 (.02)
Note: CC = Congruent-Congruent trials, CI = Congruent-Incongruent
trials, IC = Incongruent-Congruent trials, II = Incongruent-Incongruent
trials.

Random effects structure was determined by specifying increasingly complex models and
testing the likelihood difference using a chi-square test. The first model allowed for random
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intercepts across subjects, the second added a random slope of congruency, the third added a
random slope of previous congruency and the final model allowed those effects to be correlated
with the intercept. If at any point the more complex model was not preferred to the simpler
model, the fitting procedure was terminated and the last model was retained as the "final" model.
This procedure was repeated separately for each task.
Reaction Time: For all 3 tasks, the preferred model was one that included random
intercepts and slopes of congruency (ps < .001). Fixed effects estimates for each task are
displayed in Table 5. As shown, there was a significant interference effect in each task and
importantly this interference was critically modulated by the previous trial congruency (for the
sake of brevity, in all tables the previous trial congruency by current trial congruency interaction
will be referred to as the CSE). Hence, even in these non-standard variants of basic attention
tasks, which eliminated numerous confounds, the well-established CSE pattern was obtained in
each of the 3 tasks. Thus, the critical question of whether this effect was modulated by age or
task can now be addressed.
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Table 4. Fixed effects estimates for each task in Experiment 1.
Simon Task
Estimate

SE

DF

t-value

p-value

Trial

0.000

0.000

26960

-19.07

< .001

Age

0.376

0.035

74

10.74

< .003

Previous RT

0.109

0.005

27040

20.99

< .004

Congruency

0.121

0.006

74

21.09

< .005

PC

-0.004

0.002

26980

-1.64

0.100

Trial * Age

0.000

0.000

26960

-10.98

< .001

Congruency * Age

-0.016

0.012

74

-1.37

0.180

PC * Age

-0.003

0.004

26960

-0.68

0.490

CSE

-0.027

0.004

26950

-5.96

< .001

Age * CSE

0.023

26950

2.58

0.010

Trial

0.000

0.000

26860

-9.219

< .001

Age

0.535

0.039

75

13.847

< .001

Previous RT

0.090

0.005

26940

16.564

< .001

Congruency

0.110

0.008

74

13.305

< .001

PC

-0.017

0.003

26870

-6.087

< .001

Trial * Age

-0.001

0.000

26860

-11.027

< .001

Congruency * Age

0.040

0.017

74

2.417

0.02

PC * Age

-0.004

0.006

26860

-0.766

0.44

CSE

-0.023

0.006

26860

-4.158

< .001

Age * CSE

-0.023
0.011
Flanker Task

26860

-2.02

0.040

Trial

0.000

0.00

26600

-10.24

< .001

Age

0.416

0.04

73

9.74

< .001

Previous RT

0.088

0.01

26720

16.33

< .001

Congruency

0.063

0.00

72

16.59

< .001

PC

-0.008

0.00

26630

-3.07

0.002

Trial * Age

0.000

0.00

26600

-10.42

< .001

Congruency * Age

-0.026

0.01

72

-3.41

0.001

PC * Age

0.011

0.01

26630

2.06

0.040

CSE

-0.026

0.01

26600

-5.05

< .001

0.009
Stroop Task

Age * CSE
0.017
0.01
26600
1.65
0.100
Note: PC = previous trial congruency, CSE = Congruency Sequence Effect, the
current congruency by previous congruency interaction.
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Consider first the Simon task. Although there was no age by congruency interaction (p =
.18), the LME analysis indicated there was a significant age by CSE interaction (p = .01), such
that older adults exhibited a smaller CSE relative to younger adults. This interaction was driven
by the fact that age differences in Simon
interference was larger following an incongruent trial (27 ms) relative to following a congruent
trial (17 ms). Estimated condition means (both in the log transformed metric and back
transformed into mean RTs) as a function of age are shown in Table 6 and the CSE as a function
of age is graphed in the left panel of Figure 10.
In the Stroop task, there was evidence for a main effect of previous congruency,
indicating that responses were overall faster when the preceding trial was incongruent.
Furthermore, there was also evidence for an age by congruency interaction, such that
interference was larger for older adults relative to younger. Importantly, there was again a
significant modulation of the CSE by age (p = .04). As shown in the right panel of Figure 10, the
pattern is exactly opposite to that in the Simon task. Specifically, older adults exhibited a larger
CSE which was due to greater age-related differences in interference following post-congruent
trials (105 ms) compared to post-incongruent trials (71 ms). This replicates the pattern reported
by Aschenbrenner and Balota (2015), while controlling for the stimulus repetition that was
inherent to the previous design and also extending the results to a button press Stroop task.
Finally, in the flanker paradigm, there was a main effect of previous congruency (faster
responses following incongruent trials) and this effect interacted with age such that younger
adults increased their speed following incongruent trials more than older adults. More
importantly, the robust CSE was statistically equivalent across age groups suggesting that older
adults were equally able to make control adjustments in this paradigm as the younger adults (see
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bottom panel of Figure 10), although numerically the trends were for smaller effects in older
adults.

Figure 10. Interference effect as a function of the previous trial congruency (post-C =
previous congruent trials and Post-I = previous incongruent trials) for the Simon task (left
panel), the Stroop task (right panel) and the flanker task (bottom panel) as a function of age in
Experiment 1. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 5. Estimated condition means (and 95% CIs) for each task in Experiment 1.
Younger

Older
Simon Task (Log Transformed Means)

PC

PI

PC

PI

Cong

6.36 (6.31-6.41)

6.37 (6.33-6.42)

Cong

6.75 (6.7-6.8)

6.75 (6.7-6.8)

Incong

6.51 (6.46-6.55)

6.48 (6.44-6.53)

Incong

6.87 (6.82-6.92)

6.86 (6.81-6.91)

Int

0.15

0.11

CSE

Int

-0.04

0.12

0.11

CSE

-0.01

Simon Task (Back-Transformed Means)
Cong

577 (550-605)

587 (559-615)

Cong

852 (810-896)

854 (812-898)

Incong

669 (638-702)

655 (624-687)

Incong

962 (914-1012)

949 (903-999)

Int

93

69

CSE

-24

Int

110

CSE

-14

96

Stroop Task (Log Transformed Means)
PC

PI

PC

PI

Cong

6.46 (6.41-6.52)

6.45 (6.4-6.51)

Cong

6.97 (6.92-7.03)

6.97 (6.91-7.03)

Incong

6.56 (6.5-6.61)

6.54 (6.48-6.59)

Incong

7.12 (7.06-7.18)

7.08 (7.03-7.14)

Int

0.096

CSE

0.084

Int

-0.012

0.148

CSE

0.113
-0.035

Stroop Task (Back-Transformed Means)
Cong

640 (607-676)

634 (601-669)

Cong

1067 (1008-1129)

1064 (1006-1126)

Incong

705 (668-744)

690 (654-728)

Incong

1236 (1168-1308)

1191 (1126-1260)

65

56

170

127

Int
CSE

Int

-9

CSE

-43

Flanker Task (Log Transformed Means)
PC

PI

Cong

6.56 (6.5-6.61)

6.56 (6.5-6.62)

Incong

6.65 (6.59-6.71)

6.62 (6.56-6.68)

0.09

0.06

Int
CSE

PC

PI

Cong

6.98 (6.92-7.05)

6.99 (6.93-7.05)

Incong

7.04 (6.98-7.1)

7.03 (6.97-7.09)

0.06

0.04

Int

-0.04

CSE

-0.02

Flanker Task (Back-Transformed Means)
Cong
Incong
Int

704 (665-746)
773 (730-819)

707 (667-749)
750 (708-794)

69

43

Cong
Incong
Int

1079 (1015-1148)
1145 (1077-1218)

1086 (1021-1155)
1132 (1064-1204)

66

47

CSE
-26
CSE
-19
Note: Int = interference, incongruent RT – congruent RT, CSE = Post-incongruent interference – post congruent
interference. PC = previous congruent trial, PI = Previous incongruent trial. Cong = current congruent trial,
incong = current incongruent trial
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Cross-task analysis: One of the primary benefits of this design was the administration of
multiple interference tasks to the same individuals, with the same number of response
alternatives and overall list context. In order to compare age differences in interference as well as
in the CSE across the three tasks, a secondary analysis was conducted that included all tasks
together with “task” specified as a factor that was allowed to interact with age, congruency, and
previous congruency. Results from this analysis revealed several key interactions. First, there
was a significant interaction among congruency, age and task, such that age differences in
interference were larger in the Stroop task (88 ms) than in the Simon task (22 ms), 𝛽 = -.054, t =
-7.17, p < .001, as well as larger than in the flanker task (0 ms), 𝛽 = -.067, t = -8.91, p < .001.
More importantly, there was a significant 4-way interaction among congruency, previous
congruency, age and task, indicating that age differences in the Stroop CSE were different from
the age effects in the flanker CSE, 𝛽 = .003, t = 2.28, p = .02, as well as significantly different
from the Simon CSE, 𝛽 = .004, t = 2.75, p = .006. The difference in the CSE with age between
the Simon and flanker tasks was not significant (p = .65), indicating equal age differences in the
CSE between these paradigms.
Accuracy: As mentioned in the introduction, a CSE is often found in accuracy rates as
well as in response times. Furthermore, it is possible that the condition of the previous trial
simply pushes the groups differently along a speed accuracy trade off function. Thus, it is critical
to also examine errors in these tasks in addition to response times. Given the increased
complexity with estimating generalized linear models of a binary dependent variable, the model
was simplified to only include random intercepts across subjects and fixed effects of group,
congruency and previous congruency as well as all the two and three-way interactions. As shown
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below, accuracy was overall near ceiling for all groups in all tasks and therefore these analyses
will be discussed only briefly.
For the Simon task, there was a main effect of age, 𝛽 = 1.78, z = 6.17, p < .001,
indicating the older adults were more accurate than the younger adults. There was also a main
effect of condition, 𝛽 = -1.73, z = -10.21, p < .001, indicating higher accuracy in the congruent
condition. No other main effects or interactions were reliable. The estimated condition means for
this task are presented in the top portion of Table 7.
For the Stroop task, there was a main effect of age, 𝛽 = 0.76, z = 2.94, p = .003, again
indicating higher accuracy for the older adults. There was also a main effect of condition, 𝛽 =
0.64, z = -6.72, p < .001, indicating higher accuracy in the congruent condition compared to the
incongruent condition. There was also a small CSE, 𝛽 = 0.44, z = 2.32, p = .02, reflecting larger
interference effects on post-congruent trials than on post-incongruent trials. This effect did not
interact with age (p = .58). Estimated condition means are presented in the middle portion of
Table 7.
In the flanker task, there was once again a main effect of age, 𝛽 = 1.93, z = 6.37, p < .001
and a main effect of previous congruency, 𝛽 = 0.30, z = 2.29, p = .022, indicating significantly
higher accuracy on post-incongruent trials. This effect was qualified by an interaction with
congruency (i.e., the CSE), 𝛽 = 0.78, z = 2.94, p = .003. Furthermore, this interaction entered
into a higher order interaction with age, 𝛽 = 1.48, z = 2.79, p = .005. As shown in the bottom
portion of Table 7, this interaction reflects a significantly larger CSE in the older adult group.
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However, it should be emphasized again that since accuracy was overall very high in this task for
both groups these results should be interpreted with caution.

Table 6. Estimated accuracy (95% CIs) for each task in Experiment 1.
Younger

Older
Simon Task

PC

PI

Cong

0.994 (0.99-0.996)

0.99 (0.986-0.994)

Incong

0.956 (0.939-0.968)

0.97 (0.958-0.979)

-0.038

-0.02

Int
CSE

PC

PI

Cong

0.998 (0.997-0.999)

0.999 (0.998-1)

Incong

0.991 (0.986-0.994)

0.994 (0.99-0.996)

-0.007

-0.005

Int

0.018

CSE

0.002

Stroop Task
PC

PI

Cong

0.986 (0.98-0.991)

0.985 (0.978-0.99)

Incong

0.974 (0.962-0.982)

0.98 (0.97-0.986)

-0.012

-0.005

Int
CSE

PC

PI

Cong

0.995 (0.991-0.997)

0.994 (0.989-0.996)

Incong

0.985 (0.978-0.99)

0.989 (0.983-0.993)

-0.01

-0.005

Int

0.007

CSE

0.005

Flanker Task
PC

PI

PC

PI

Cong

0.98 (0.97-0.986)

0.984 (0.976-0.989)

Cong

0.998 (0.996-0.999)

0.997 (0.994-0.998)

Incong
Int

0.976 (0.965-0.984)
-0.004

0.981 (0.973-0.987)
-0.003

Incong
Int

0.995 (0.991-0.997)
-0.003

0.998 (0.996-0.999)
0.001

CSE
0.001
CSE
0.004
Note: PC = previous trial congruent, PI = previous trial incongruent, Int = interference, incongruent accuracy minus
congruent accuracy, CSE = difference in interference across previous trial types.

Individual differences analysis: In order to examine the influence of working memory
capacity on our interference measures, a series of bivariate correlations were conducted between
working memory span, interference and the CSE in each of the tasks collapsed across age group
in order to increase statistical power. This analysis revealed surprisingly little correlation either
between working memory span and the interference and / or CSE measures or among the
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interference measures themselves. The null relationship with working memory is inconsistent
with published findings (Aschenbrenenr & Balota, 2015), however they are difficult to interpret
given the relatively small sample size and could be due either to the unreliability of these
measures (the CSE is the difference of two differences) or a true lack of relationships among
these processes. As such, this analysis should be considered exploratory only. The full
correlation matrix of all variables is provided and discussed in Appendix A.
Reaction Time Distribution Analysis: RT distributions were examined by calculating 5
quantiles for each congruency by previous congruency cell separately for each task. Quantiles
are the RT at which a certain percentage of the distribution falls. For example, 50% of all RTs
fall under the .5 quantile. As the distribution becomes more and more skewed in later quantiles,
the RT quantiles become further and further apart. For the present results, the .1, .3., .5, .7 and .9
quantiles were examined which is typically sufficient to capture the full shape of the distribution
(see Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002). Quantiles were calculated for each subject and submitted to a
2 (age group) x 2 (previous congruency) x 2 (current congruency) x 5 (quantile) analysis of
variance (ANOVA)2. As with the raw RT analyses, there are a number of interesting effects from
such an analyses, however for the present purposes the following interactions will be specifically
highlighted: CSE, CSE by quantile, CSE by age and CSE by age by quantile. Any interaction
with "quantile" would indicate that the interacting effect changes across the distribution (e.g.,

2

Although quantiles can be estimated and analyzed in the LME framework, which may ultimately increase power,
doing so is computationally expensive and not yet standard in the field. Thus, to maintain comparability with
published work as must as possible, we opted to utlize the ANOVA analysis.

49

becomes larger or smaller at longer RTs). In contrast, an additive effect with quantile would
indicate simple shifting of the distributions.

Table 7. ANOVA statistics for the quantile analysis in Experiment 1
Simon Task
Effect

Stroop Task

Flanker Task

DFn

DFd

F

p-value

DFd

F

p-value

DFd

F

p-value

Age

1

74

89.54

< .01

74

134.32

< .01

73

77.97

< .01

PC

1

74

14.67

< .01

74

11.09

< .01

73

1.64

0.20

C

1

74

339.17

< .01

74

155.54

< .01

73

181.00

< .01

Q

4

296

282.10

< .01

296

391.94

< .01

292

706.36

< .01

Age * PC

1

74

0.00

1.00

74

2.53

0.12

73

4.26

0.04

Age * C

1

74

6.86

0.01

74

23.53

< .01

73

0.04

0.84

Age * Q

4

296

19.30

< .01

296

56.20

< .01

292

36.71

< .01

CSE

1

74

14.14

< .01

74

17.62

< .01

73

19.44

< .01

PC * Q

4

296

1.18

0.32

296

3.13

0.02

292

0.83

0.51

C*Q

4

296

3.83

< .01

296

7.45

< .01

292

0.68

0.61

Age * CSE

1

74

4.83

0.03

74

8.24

0.01

73

0.97

0.33

Age * PC * Q

4

296

1.26

0.28

296

2.62

0.04

292

1.11

0.35

Age * C * Q

4

296

6.41

< .01

296

1.06

0.37

292

0.38

0.82

CSE * Q

4

296

0.24

0.92

296

2.96

0.02

292

0.97

0.42

Age * CSE * Q

4

296

1.30

0.27

296

2.65

0.03

292

4.26

< .01

Note: CSE = Congruency Sequence Effect, the current congruency by previous congruency
interaction. DFn = numerator degrees of freedom (same for all tasks), DFd = denominator
degrees of freedom. PC = previous trial congruency, C = current trial congruency, Q =
Quantile

Full ANOVA tables for each task are provided in Table 8. As before, the Simon task will
be discussed first. Once again there was evidence for a CSE, such that interference was smaller
on post-incongruent trials relative to post-congruent trials and, as before, this effect interacted
with age such that older adults showed smaller adjustments across trials. Interestingly, the CSE
did NOT interact with quantile nor did the three-way interaction further interact with age. These
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quantiles are plotted in top panel of Figure 11, which graphs the interference effect for postcongruent and post-incongruent trials as a function of quantile. It is clear from this graph and
these analyses that interference differences do not change with increasing quantiles for either age
group. In other words, the previous trial simply shifts the distribution for both age groups, but to
a lesser extent for the older adults leading to reduced CSEs.
Turning to the Stroop task, the ANOVA revealed the expected effects. That is, there was
a congruency by previous congruency interaction (the CSE) and a CSE by age interaction. The
more interesting results were the significant CSE by quantile interaction, indicating that the
interference difference as a function of previous trial changed as RTs become longer. More
importantly, this interaction was further modulated by age (p = .03). As shown in the middle
panel of Figure 11 this interaction was driven by the older adults who exhibited increasing
interference on post-congruent trials whereas for post-incongruent trials, interference remained
relatively constant.
The flanker paradigm also revealed significant effects albeit ones that were not
necessarily predicted a priori. Specifically, although there was a significant CSE which did not
interact with age or quantile, there was a significant age by CSE by quantile interaction (p =
.002). As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 11 this interaction was due to a slight increase of
the CSE in the slowest quantile for the young adults only whereas older adults interference
remained constant across the full distribution. However, as described below, because this
interaction was not replicated in Experiment 2 and was not predicted a priori, it should be
interpreted with some degree of caution.
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A follow-up ANOVA using “task” as a factor revealed the five-way interaction among
task, age, quantile, current and previous congruency was significant, F(8,584) = 3.78, p < .001,
indicating that the cross task differences in the distributions as a function of age identified above
were indeed reliable.

Figure 11. Congruency sequence effect across quantiles for each age group in the Simon (top
panel), Stroop (middle panel) and flanker (bottom panel) tasks in Experiment 1. Error bars are
95% confidence intervals.
Discussion
There are several novel results from Experiment 1. First, evidence was obtained for a
congruency sequence effect in 3 different interference paradigms that were designed to control
for numerous cross-trial confounds (Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014b;
Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003). Second, it was shown that in two of those tasks, the CSE
interacted with age in theoretically interesting directions. Specifically, the CSE was smaller with
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age in the Simon task but larger with age in the Stroop task. No age differences were found in the
flanker task although the trends were towards a smaller effect in the older adult group. Third,
changes in the CSE were mapped at the level of the RT distribution. Specifically, the CSE in the
Simon task was reflected in a simple shift in the RT distribution whereas the Stroop CSE
changed distributional shape (i.e., interacted with quantile) for older (p = .018) but not younger
adults (p = .55).
Although complex, these initial analyses converge on a consistent story. Specifically, the
CSE in two different interference tasks was significantly modulated by age, even after
controlling for cross trial response contingency and baseline processing speed via log
transformed RTs and linear mixed effects models. However, the pattern of effects manifested in
opposing directions across the two tasks. In the Simon task, the CSE was smaller in the older
adult group and this interaction was driven by differences on post-incongruent trials. Similarly,
the flanker task showed trends towards smaller CSEs for the older adults but this was not
statistically reliable. In contrast, in the Stroop task, the older adult group showed a significantly
larger CSE with differences being driven by post congruent trials, consistent with past results
(Aschenbrenner & Balota, 2015).
The fact that contingency, repetition confounds, number of response alternatives and
overall list context were carefully controlled in this design suggests these performance
differences across tasks are not due to contingency learning or repetition-type priming effects.
This leaves either deficits in conflict adaptation or differences in pathway priming as viable
explanatory mechanisms for the age effects in the CSE. The fact that the age effects manifested
in different directions across tasks questions whether a single account can underlie adjustments
in these paradigms. For example, the Simon data, and to a lesser extent flanker, appear consistent
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with the conflict monitoring account, that is, age differences in changes in interference control
induced by conflict. Specifically, the presence of conflict (i.e., incongruent trials) recruits
additional support from the the attentional control mechanism which reduces interference on
subsequent trials. This is consistent with a previous study that found the signature negative delta
slope for Simon interference is found primarily for post-incongruent trials (Ridderinkhof, 2002).
The data are then consistent with the notion that older adults are less able to increase control
across trials.
However, this explanation does not appear to be able to account for the Stroop data. If an
incongruent trial prompts greater control over the word information, and if the ability to increase
control declines with age as suggested by the Simon and flanker data, one would again expect to
see smaller adjustments with age, a pattern which was clearly not observed. Instead, the data are
more consistent with pathway priming. Specifically, if the utility of the irrelevant information on
the preceding trial is high (word information on a congruent trial in the case of Stroop), that will
prime that pathway for use on the following trial. If the priming is larger for older adults and / or
the ability to control that cross-trial priming is reduced one would observe greater age
differences on post-congruent items. Put another way, older adults are less able to increase their
inhibitory control from trial to trial in all tasks. However, these changes are masked in the Stroop
task potentially due to pathway priming mechanisms.
Why then does the Stroop task specifically show the pathway priming effect and not
Simon or flanker tasks? For Simon in particular it seems possible that the irrelevant spatial
location should prime the use of that “pathway” on the next trial, at least according to the
pathway priming account. The data clearly do not support this conclusion. Of course, the Stroop
and Simon tasks differ on a number of dimensions, and in particular in terms of the relationship
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between the relevant and irrelevant dimensions of the stimuli. Specifically, Stroop stimuli are
tightly integrated into a single perceptual object whereas Simon (and flanker) consist of more
spatial overlap of separate objects. As argued by Spieler et al. (2000), these two types of
attentional selection can have differential influences on response dynamics in standard
interference paradigms. Specifically, attribute selection results in both shifting and skewing of
the RT distributions whereas tasks that involve spatial selection (local / global tasks and flanker
were used by Spieler et al. 2000) results more in shifting and no changes in skew. Indeed, when
the color and word information are spatially separated, the interference effect manifests as simple
shifting similar to the local/global task (Spieler et al. 2000).
Following these results, it is possible that under conditions which specific attributes must
be selected from within a single object, pathway priming mechanisms operate whereas in spatial
selection tasks different pathways are not as active across trials. Alternatively, it is possible that
the spatial stimulus-response mapping in the Simon task are more primitive and more ingrained
than the color-word mappings required in the Stroop task. Thus, the Simon task might place
stronger demands on inhibitory control. However, this explanation seems to be eliminated by the
fact that age differences in Stroop interference were larger than in Simon interference in the
current paradigm.
At a more theoretical level, these results also seem to eliminate from consideration at
least one of the possible mechanisms proposed to underlie cross-trial adjustments. Specifically,
the temporal learning accounts suggests that previous trial difficulty or possibly changes in
contingency induce a change in response thresholds for the following trial. Threshold changes
are inconsistent with the data from the Simon task which showed only distributional shifting as a
function of previous trial type. Changes in response thresholds are strongly associated with both
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shifting and skewing of the distribution (Matzke & Wagenmakers, 2009)3. It is possible,
however, that the temporal learning model could still accommodate the patterns in the Stroop
task. Furthermore, because RT distributional analyses do not take into account error rates, there
can never be a direct one-to-one mapping between distributional observations (shifting vs.
skewing) and underlying diffusion model parameters. Only application of the full diffusion
model can directly address questions regarding underlying components of processing.
Experiment 2
Although the RT distributional results from Experiment 1 are informative, one of the
primary goals of this work was to contrast competing theories of the CSE by applying an explicit
model (i.e., the diffusion model) to these standard tasks of attentional control. However, such an
analysis was precluded in Experiment 1 because the accuracy rates were very near ceiling. This
can pose problems for the diffusion model which requires enough error trials to form a stable
reaction time distribution of those responses (see Voss et al., 2013). Thus, the aim of Experiment
2 was to implement a procedure that would increase the likelihood of producing errors in each
task.
To achieve this goal, a response deadline was imposed for each participant that was
individually calibrated separately for each task. Specifically, the participant was timed during the
practice block and a deadline was set at their average response latency for the entire block. If the
participant exhibited difficulty in understanding the instructions or made several errors during
practice, the block was run a second time. Then during the test phase, on each trial, if a response
was not initiated before the deadline was reached, a buzzing tone was played through the

3

Although as already mentioned, Spieler et al. (2000) were able to model distributional shifting as changes in
response boundaries.
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computer speakers. Participants were instructed that their goal was to respond at a fast enough
rate that they did not hear the buzzing tone. However, if they did hear a tone they were to initiate
a response immediately even if it required them to guess. As shown below, this procedure was
successful in prompting both groups of participants to respond faster than was observed in
Experiment 1.
Due to the anticipated increased cognitive effort required by maintaining a fast enough
rate of responding that the deadline was beat, the number of trials in each task was reduced to
192 total trials (compared to 384 in Experiment 1). In addition, accuracy feedback was no longer
provided after each trial and was replaced by a 1000 ms blank screen ITI. This was done in order
to lessen the focus on accuracy. In all other respects, this experiment was identical to Experiment
1.
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A second goal of Experiment 2 was to expand the range of individual differences
measures collected. As noted, the lack of correlations in Experiment 1 (see Appendix A) was
surprising and it was decided to investigate CSE effects with not only working memory capacity
(measured again with the computation span task) but also overall processing speed (measured
with the CVOE task, described below) and attentional control (measured with a standard version
of the Stroop task). If correlations appear with some individual differences measures and not
others, one can at least rule out concerns about unreliability of the CSE in contributing to the null
effects found in Experiment 1.
Method
Participants: Thirty-six younger adults and 36 older adults were recruited from the same
sources as in Experiment 1. One older adult was removed from all analyses due to an error with
the speakers during the deadline procedure leaving 35 older adults available for analysis.

Table 8. Mean (SD) for age (in years), education (in years), Short Blessed Test, working
memory span, CVOE accuracy and RT and Stroop microphone accuracy and RT in
Experiment 2.
Younger
Older
N
36
35
Age
19.78 (1.35)
70.34 (3.41)
Education
13.49 (2.21)
17.14 (2.58)
Short Blessed Test
NA
.58 (1.08)
CompSpan
14.27 (6.88)
12.77 (6.84)
CVOE Accuracy
.95 (04)
.98 (.03)
CVOE RT
615 (68)
866 (145)
Stroop Mic Accuracy
.08 (.08)
.04 (.07)
Stroop Mic RT
101 (39)
185 (87)
Note: CompSpan = Total number of correct recall trials on the computation span task.
Stroop mic accuracy and RT is the interference score (incongruent – congruent) from
the microphone version of the task. The Short Blessed Test ranges from 0-28, with a
score of 4 or less equal to normal cognition.
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Demographic information on this cohort is provided in Table 9. Younger adults participated in
exchange for course credit and older adults were given monetary compensation ($20).
Materials and Procedure: As noted, the procedure of Experiment 2 was virtually
identical to Experiment 1 with the exception of the response deadlining procedure and a
reduction in the number of trials. In addition to the working memory task, participants were also
given a standard, 104 item Stroop color naming task requiring vocal responses to measure
attentional control (see Spieler et al., 1996). This version utilized four colors (RED, BLUE,
GREEN, and YELLOW) and four neutral words (BAD, LEGAL, POOR, DEEP). There were 36
congruent items, 36 incongruent items (each word appeared in each of the mismatching colors 3
times) and 32 neutral items (each neutral word appeared in each color twice). Finally,
participants completed a speeded consonant-vowel, odd-even (CVOE) decision task as a measure
of processing speed. In this task, participants are shown a letter number pair (e.g., A 16) and for
thirty trials indicated if the letter was a consonant or a vowel using the keyboard. They then
completed 30 trials on which they indicated whether the number was odd or even. Note this task
also includes a “switching” block whereby the participant first must attend to the letter and then
the number alternating every two trials. This block was not included in the present design in
order to obtain a measure of processing speed relatively separate from attentional control
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Table 9. Average (SD) response deadline (in ms) and percent of trials that were faster than
the deadline and the proportion of trials that were trimmed from analysis.
Deadline

% Faster

CC Trim
CI Trim
IC Trim
II Trim
Simon Task
.09 (.04)
.09 (.05)
.21 (.12) .22 (.12)
Younger
653 (99)
.87 (.12)
.07 (.04)
.08 (.04)
.09 (.04) .07 (.04)
Older
1171 (319) .95 (.05)
Stroop Task
.17 (.06)
.14 (.06)
.18 (.10) .22 (.09)
Younger
700 (115) .84 (.11)
.10 (.08)
.11 (.05)
.13 (.11) .16 (.09)
Older
1500 (406) .90 (.13)
Flanker Task
.18 (.07)
.19 (.07)
.20 (.12) .22 (.12)
Younger
821 (136) .87 (.13)
.11 (.06)
.15 (.06)
.14 (.05) .13 (.06)
Older
1437 (314) .92 (.10)
Note: CC Trim = % of trials trimmed from the congruent-congruent condition, CI Trim = %
of trials trimmed from the congruent-incongruent condition, IC Trim = % of trials trimmed
from the incongruent-congruent condition and II trim = % of trials trimmed from the
incongruent-incongruent condition.
processes. Finally, the older adult participants were administered the Short Blessed Test to
screen for cognitive impairment (Katzman et al., 1983).
Results
The average response deadline for each group and the proportion of trials that were faster
than the deadline are displayed in Table 10. As shown, the participants were relatively
responsive to the deadline with between 85-95% of the total trials meeting this criterion. Raw
response times were trimmed and analyzed in the same method as in Experiment 1. The percent
of trimmed trials from each condition are shown in Table 10 which as shown was fairly high.
However, it is important to keep in mind that any trial that was immediately following an error
was removed (to avoid post-error slowing confounds) and because our procedure was designed
to increase the error rate, subsequently a larger number of trials were removed relative to
Experiment 1.
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Table 10. Estimated RTs for each task across Experiments 1 and 2.
Simon
Experiment 1
Younger
Older

RT
6.406
6.828

Younger
Older

606
924

Younger
Older

RT
6.476
7.062

Younger
Older

650
1167

Younger
Older

RT
6.578
7.033

Younger
Older

719
1133

Experiment 2

95% CI
RT
95% CI
6.256
6.360 - 6.453
6.207 - 6.305
6.657
6.779 - 6.877
6.607 - 6.707
Back-Transformed Means
578 - 635
521
496 - 547
879 - 970
778
740 - 818
Stroop
95% CI
RT
95% CI
6.304
6.420 - 6.533
6.244 - 6.363
6.872
7.003 - 7.122
6.812 - 6.933
Back-Transformed Means
614 - 687
547
515 - 580
1100 - 1239
965
909 - 1026
Flanker
95% CI
RT
95% CI
6.445
6.521 - 6.634
6.385 - 6.504
6.859
6.973 - 7.093
6.799 - 6.920
Back-Transformed Means
679-761
629
593 - 668
1067 - 1204
953
897 - 1012

Cross-Experiment Comparison: Given that the primary goal of Experiment 2 was to
increase the error rate by speeding up responses, analyses of accuracy and response times across
Experiments 1 and 2 are first presented. Overall response latencies are displayed in Table 11. It
is clear from this table that speed increased across the two experiments with the proportional
increase ranging from 13 – 18% for both younger and older adults.
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The LME analyses on the Simon task revealed significant main effects of age, 𝛽 = 0.422,
t = 12.22, p < .0001, and of experiment, 𝛽 = -.161, t = -6.47, p < .0001, but no interaction, 𝛽 = 0.021, t = -.43, p = .671. In the Stroop task, there were again main effects of age, 𝛽 = 0.586, t =
14.01, p < .0001, and of experiment, 𝛽 = -.181, t = -6.02, p < .0001, and no interaction, 𝛽 = 0.018, t = -.29, p = .772. Similarly, in the flanker task, there were also main effects of age, 𝛽 =
0.455, t = 10.88, p < .0001, and of experiment, 𝛽 = -.153, t = -5.104, p < .0001, but no
interaction, 𝛽 = -0.04, t = -0.673, p = .502. Thus, across both experiments, older adults were
slower than younger, responses in Experiment 2 were faster than Experiment 1, and both groups
of participants increased their speed a proportionally equivalent amount.
Turning now to the accuracy analyses, total accuracy (collapsed across current and
previous congruency) for each task and each experiment are displayed in Table 12. As shown in
the table, there were clear drops in accuracy across each task, which appeared larger for the
younger adult group. These observations were confirmed using LME analyses. Specifically, in
the Simon task, there were significant main effects of age, 𝛽 = 1.65, z = 6.43, p < .0001, and of
experiment, 𝛽 = -0.96, z = -5.20, p < .0001, indicating higher accuracy for the older adults and
Experiment 1 respectively. The interaction was not reliable 𝛽 = 0.623, z = 1.7, p = . 089, but
clearly was trending towards larger accuracy differences in the younger adults.
Similarly, in the Stroop task, there were again main effects of age, 𝛽 = .720, z = 3.02, p <
.0001, and of experiment, 𝛽 = -1.149, z =-6.74, p < .0001. Once again there was a marginal
interaction between age and experiment, 𝛽 = 0.631, z = 1.86, p = . 062, indicating the accuracy
change across experiments was trending larger for younger adults. Finally, in the flanker task,
there were main effects of age, 𝛽 = 1.80, z = 6.91, p < .0001, and of experiment, 𝛽 = -1.54, z =8.68, p < .0001, but no hint of an interaction, 𝛽 = -0.180, z = -0.54, p = . 592. Together, these
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results confirm that the response deadlining procedure was able to increase the error rate by
speeding up responses. The proportional speed up across experiments was identical across the

Table 11. Estimated accuracy means for each task across Experiments 1 and 2.
Simon
Experiment 1

Experiment 2

Younger
Older

Accuracy
0.978
0.996

95% CI
Accuracy
0.925
0.970 - 0.984
0.992
0.994 - 0.997
Stroop

95% CI
0.899 - 0.944
0.988 - 0.995

Younger
Older

Accuracy
0.981
0.991

95% CI
Accuracy
0.922
0.974 - 0.986
0.978
0.987 - 0.993
Flanker

95% CI
0.896 - 0.942
0.970 - 0.985

Younger
Older

Accuracy
0.979
0.997

95% CI
Accuracy
0.918
0.972 - 0.985
0.982
0.995 - 0.998

95% CI
0.892 - 0.939
0.975 - 0.988

age groups but the reduction in accuracy was trending4 (numerically) towards a larger change in
the younger adult group.
Response Times: Fixed effect coefficients for each task in Experiment 2 are shown in
Table 13. In the Simon task, there was a main effect of congruency such that responses to
incongruent trials were slower than to congruent trials. There was also a significant CSE
indicating reduced interference following incongruent trials relative to following congruent
trials. Critically, there was also a significant age by CSE interaction such that older adults

4

I tested all data combined across tasks to increase our power but the age group by experiment (Exp 1 vs. 2
interaction) still failed to reach significance, β = .417, z = 1.43, p =.15.
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exhibited a smaller CSE which was driven by larger age-related interference effects on postincongruent trials (27 ms) relative to post-congruent trials (20 ms). Estimated condition means
are shown in the top portion of Table 14 and this effect is graphed in the left portion of Figure
12, which replicates the pattern that was observed in Experiment 1.
In the Stroop task, the interference effect was significant and interacted with age
indicating larger interference effects in older adults. The main effect of the previous trial
congruency was also reliable, indicating overall faster responses following incongruent trials.
However, the CSE was no longer significant (p = .10) nor did it reliably interact with age (p =

Figure 12. Congruency sequence effect for each age group in the Simon (left panel), Stroop
(right panel) and flanker (bottom panel) tasks in Experiment 2. Error bars are 95% confidence
intervals.
.15). Although not statistically significant, the pattern of means was in the same direction as in
Experiment 1, specifically there was a larger CSE for older adults as shown in the middle portion
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of Table 14 and the right panel of Figure 12. Of course, it should be noted that the number of
trials per participant was smaller compared to Experiment 1 which may be reducing the power to
detect these subtle effects.
Finally, in the flanker task, there was main effect of congruency that interacted with age,
namely that older adults were showing less interference than younger. Although surprising, a
lack of age effects in this version of the flanker paradigm has been shown before (Salthouse,
2010), suggesting that this task is not as sensitive to age-related differences. Furthermore, the
overall CSE was not significant but there was a marginal interaction among the CSE and age (p
= .05). As shown in bottom portion of Table 14 this interaction was driven by a slightly negative
CSE for younger adults and a slightly positive effect for the older group.
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Table 12. Fixed effects coefficients for each task in Experiment 2.
Simon Task
Estimate

SE

DF

t-value

p-value

(Intercept)

6.111

0.054

6666

113.62

< .001

Trial

0.000

0.000

11170

-6.84

< .001

Age

0.374

0.028

70

13.46

< .001

Previous RT

0.054

0.008

11250

6.714

< .001

Congruency

0.130

0.006

70

22.41

< .001

Previous Congruency (PC)

0.005

0.003

11200

1.84

0.066

Trial * Age

0.000

0.000

11170

-3.24

0.001

Congruency * Age

-0.012

0.012

70

-1.03

0.305

PC * Age

-0.006

0.005

11180

-1.12

0.263

CSE

-0.040

0.005

11170

-7.26

< .001

Age * CSE

0.026

0.011

11170

2.37

0.018

Stroop Task
(Intercept)

6.199

0.061

3692

101.37

< .001

Trial

-0.001

0.000

10940

-7.46

< .001

Age

0.539

0.041

70

13.1

< .001

Previous RT

0.059

0.009

11020

6.81

< .001

Congruency

0.112

0.008

69

13.23

< .001

Previous Congruency (PC)

-0.009

0.004

10960

-2.30

< .001

Trial * Age

-0.001

0.000

10940

-10.37

< .001

Congruency * Age

0.078

0.017

69

4.60

< .001

PC * Age

-0.013

0.008

10940

-1.77

0.078

CSE

-0.012

0.008

10940

-1.65

0.099

Age * CSE

-0.021

0.015

10940

-1.43

0.153

Flanker Task
(Intercept)

6.203

0.060

5376

103.38

< .001

Trial

0.000

0.000

11050

-5.11

< .001

Age

0.388

0.034

70

11.27

< .001

Previous RT

0.068

0.009

11150

7.83

< .001

Congruency

0.060

0.004

68

13.67

< .001

Previous Congruency (PC)

-0.007

0.004

11070

-2.08

0.038

Congruency * Age

-0.021

0.009

68

-2.356

0.0213

PC * Age

-0.007

0.007

11070

-0.932

0.3513

CSE

-0.007

0.007

11050

-0.983

0.3255

0.028
0.014
1.959
Age * CSE
11050
Note: CSE = Congruency Sequence Effect, the current congruency by previous congruency interaction
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0.0501

Table 13. Estimated condition means (95% CIs) for the reaction time analysis in Experiment
2.
Younger

Older
Simon Task (Log Transformed Means)

PC

PI

Cong

6.19 (6.15-6.23)

6.22 (6.18-6.26)

Incong

6.35 (6.31-6.39)

6.33 (6.29-6.37)

0.163

0.11

Int
CSE

-0.053

PC

PI

Cong

6.58 (6.54-6.62)

6.59 (6.55-6.63)

Incong

6.72 (6.68-6.75)

6.7 (6.66-6.74)

0.137

0.111

Int
CSE

-0.026

Simon Task (Back-Transformed Means)
Cong

487 (468-507)

504 (485-525)

Cong

719 (691-748)

730 (702-760)

Incong

573 (551-596)

563 (541-585)

Incong

825 (793-858)

816 (784-849)

86

59

106

86

Int
CSE

-28

Int
CSE

-20

Stroop Task (Log Transformed Means)
PC

PI

Cong

6.29 (6.23-6.35)

6.29 (6.23-6.34)

Incong

6.36 (6.3-6.42)

6.36 (6.3-6.42)

0.074

0.072

Int
CSE

-0.002

PC

PI

Cong

6.79 (6.73-6.84)

6.78 (6.72-6.84)

Incong

6.95 (6.89-7.01)

6.92 (6.86-6.98)

0.162

0.139

Int
CSE

-0.023

Stroop Task (Back-Transformed Means)
Cong

538 (507-570)

537 (507-569)

Cong

Incong

579 (546-614)

577 (544-612)

Incong

41

40

Int
CSE

-1

885 (835-939)

882 (831-935)

1042 (982-1105)

1014 (956-1075)

156

132

Int
CSE

-24

Flanker Task (Log Transformed Means)
PC

PI

Cong

6.42 (6.37-6.47)

6.43 (6.38-6.48)

Incong

6.5 (6.45-6.55)

6.49 (6.44-6.54)

0.081

0.06

Int
CSE

-0.021

PC

PI

Cong

6.83 (6.78-6.88)

6.81 (6.77-6.86)

Incong

6.88 (6.83-6.92)

6.87 (6.82-6.92)

0.046

0.053

Int
CSE

0.007

Flanker Task (Back-Transformed Means)
Cong

615 (586-646)

619 (590-650)

Cong

924 (880-970)

911 (868-957)

Incong

667 (636-700)

658 (627-690)

Incong

968 (922-1016)

961 (915-1009)

52.0

38.0

44.0

50.0

Int

Int

CSE
-14.0
CSE
6.0
Note: PC = previous trial congruent, PI = previous trial incongruent, int = incongruent RT – congruent RT, CSE
= congruency sequence effect (SI post-incongruent – SI post congruent). Log means are in the top portion of
each panel and the back-transformed means below.
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Accuracy: The accuracy analysis in the Simon task revealed a significant main effect of
age, 𝛽 = 2.18, z = 7.50, p < .001, and a main effect of congruency, 𝛽 = -1.34, z = -9.52, p < .001,
indicating higher accuracy for the older adults and in the congruent condition. There were
several higher order interactions including age by condition, 𝛽 =0.81, z = 2.88, p = .004,
indicating a larger interference effect for the younger adults, and age by previous congruency, 𝛽
= 0.66, z = 2.36, p = .02, such that the previous trial effect was larger for younger adults. Finally,
there was a significant CSE, 𝛽 = 1.12, z = 4.02, p < .001, however this effect did not interact
with age (p = .83). Condition means are displayed in the top portion of Table 15.
Turning to the Stroop task, there was a main effect of age, 𝛽 = 1.55, z = 6.55, p < .001,
and of congruency, 𝛽 = -1.02, z = -9.73, p < .001. In addition, there was an age by congruency
interaction, 𝛽 = -0.94, z = -4.47, p < .001, indicating smaller interference effects for the older
adults and a significant CSE, 𝛽 = .497, z = 2.37, p = .018, such that interference was smaller
following incongruent trials than congruent trials. The CSE also interacted with age, 𝛽 = 0.87, z
= 2.08, p = .037, indicating a larger CSE for the older adult group. Condition means are
displayed in the middle portion of Table 15.
Finally, in the flanker task the only reliable effect was a main effect of age, 𝛽 = 1.55, z =
7.57, p < .001, which once again indicated older adults were more accurate than the younger
participants. There were no higher order interactions in this task.
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Table 14. Estimated accuracy means (95% CIs) for each task in Experiment 2.
Younger

Older
Simon Task

PC

PI

Cong

0.983 (0.973-0.989)

0.966 (0.949-0.977)

Incong

0.849 (0.798-0.889)

0.899 (0.861-0.928)

-0.134

-0.067

Int
CSE

PC

PI

Cong

0.996 (0.992-0.998)

0.996 (0.992-0.998)

Incong

0.982 (0.971-0.989)

0.994 (0.989-0.997)

-0.014

-0.002

Int

0.067

CSE

0.012

Stroop Task
PC

PI

Cong

0.934 (0.91-0.952)

0.948 (0.927-0.963)

Incong

0.888 (0.852-0.916)

0.915 (0.885-0.938)

-0.046

-0.033

Int
CSE

PC

PI

Cong

0.993 (0.988-0.996)

0.99 (0.983-0.994)

Incong

0.955 (0.937-0.969)

0.972 (0.959-0.981)

-0.038

-0.018

Int

0.013

CSE

0.02

Flanker Task
PC

PI

Cong

0.921 (0.896-0.941)

0.931 (0.909-0.949)

Incong

0.907 (0.879-0.929)

0.908 (0.88-0.93)

-0.014

-0.023

Int
CSE

-0.0009

Cong
Incong
Int
CSE

PC

PI

0.982 (0.973-0.988)

0.98 (0.97-0.987)

0.98 (0.97-0.987)

0.982 (0.973-0.988)

-0.002

0.002
-0.0004

Note: PC = previous trial congruent, PI = previous trial incongruent, int = incongruent accuracy –
congruent accuracy, CSE = congruency sequence effect (SI post-incongruent – SI post congruent).

Individual differences analysis: Although the interference effects in Experiment 2 were
more tightly correlated than in Experiment 1 (rs ranging from .23 to .43, ps < .05), there was
again little to no systematic association with the individual differences measures. Specifically,
the only correlation with the CSE was in the flanker task with overall processing speed (r = .37,
p = .002). In addition, Stroop interference from the microphone task correlated with interference
in the manual Stroop task (r = .59, p < .001) and processing speed also correlated with
interference in the manual Stroop task (r = .35, p = .003). No other relationships were reliable.
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Full correlation matrices and scatterplots of significant relationships are provided and discussed
in Appendix B.

Table 15. ANOVA statistics for the quantile analysis in Experiment 2.
Simon Task

Stroop Task

Flanker Task

Effect
DFn DFd
F
p
F
p
F
p
Age
1
69 161.71 < .001 129.33 < .001 115.58 < .001
7.86
0.01
0.55
0.46
1.23
0.27
PC
1
69
C
1
69 492.55 < .001 130.28 < .001 146.49 < .001
Q
4
276 777.81 < .001 376.25 < .001 594.96 < .001
0.36
0.55
1.24
0.27
1.08
0.30
Age * PC
1
69
10.95 < .001 36.42 < .001 0.05
0.83
Age * C
1
69
Age * Q
4
276 29.59 < .001 39.01 < .001 32.29 < .001
38.84 < .001 3.79
0.06
0.12
0.74
CSE
1
69
0.82
0.51
4.16 < .001 0.39
0.81
PC * Q
4
276
4.25 < .001 17.51 < .001 1.64
0.16
C*Q
4
276
0.27
0.61
3.49
0.07
2.36
0.13
Age * CSE
1
69
0.65
0.63
1.18
0.32
1.59
0.18
Age * PC * Q
4
276
5.34 < .001 1.84
0.12
0.79
0.53
Age * C * Q
4
276
0.82
0.51
1.30
0.27
0.67
0.61
CSE * Q
4
276
0.86
0.49
0.78
0.54
0.96
0.43
Age * CSE * Q
4
276
Note: CSE = Congruency Sequence Effect, the current congruency by previous congruency
interaction. DFn = numerator degrees of freedom (same for all tasks), DFd = denominator
degrees of freedom. PC = previous trial congruency, C = current trial congruency, Q = Quantile
Reaction Time Distributions: Reaction time quantiles were calculated and analyzed in
the same manner as in Experiment 1. As before only the effects of the CSE, and its interaction
with quantile and age will be highlighted and discussed and the full ANOVA table is provided in
Table 16.
The effects in the Simon task are shown in the top panel of Figure 13. As confirmed by
ANOVA, there was a reliable CSE but this effect did not interact with age nor with quantile,
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again indicating that the CSE in this task is reflected by a simple shifting of the distribution. In
this case, the shifting was of similar magnitude between younger and older adults.

Figure 13. Congruency sequence effect across quantiles for each age group in the Simon (top
panel), Stroop (middle panel) and flanker (bottom panel) tasks in Experiment 2. Error bars are
95% confidence intervals
The Stroop quantiles are displayed in the middle panel of Figure 13. Somewhat
surprisingly, there was no evidence for a CSE under these speeded conditions. Furthermore, the
CSE did not interact with age or quantile in this design. Similarly, in the flanker task, there was
no evidence for a CSE nor for an interaction with age or quantile (see bottom panel of Figure
13).
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Interim Discussion
Although the patterns in the mean RTs were quite similar between Experiments 1 and 2
(albeit shy of significance in the latter), the effects on the distributions were much less robust.
This is perhaps not surprising given that participants were under more stringent speeded
instructions which likely changed the dynamics of task performance. The number of trials was
also reduced in Experiment 2 which consequently makes for a less stable estimation of the
reaction time distribution. It should be noted, however, that the primary goal of this follow up
study was to encourage fast enough responses that error trials would become more frequent. The
implemented deadline procedure was only partially successful. Specifically, while the younger
adults produced between 8 and 10% errors in each task, the older adults still maintained a very
high rate of accuracy (~98%).
It is interesting that the older adults in this sample were able to speed up their responses
an equal amount as the younger adults and yet still retained such a high rate of accuracy.
Although the cross-experiment changes in accuracy were not significantly different across
younger and older adults, there were clear trends for larger changes in the younger adult group
with older adult participants remaining very close to ceiling. This suggests that the older adults in
Experiment 1 were unnecessarily conservative in their responding, meaning they slowed down
excessively to maintain accuracy, which is consistent with reports from other tasks (Starns &
Ratcliff, 2010). At any rate, the errors for the younger adults should be sufficient to warrant a
diffusion model analysis of these data, but due to the differential engagement with the
instructions between groups and the possible influences of high accuracy on model fit for the
older adults, diffusion model analyses were conducted separately on older and younger adult
groups.
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Diffusion Model Analyses
The diffusion model was fit to each participants data individually using the fast-dm
software (Voss, Voss, & Lerche, 2015) which simulation studies have shown recover true
parameters as well as or better than other readily available software packages (Ratcliff &
Childers, 2015). The fast-dm program finds the optimal model parameters by minimizing the
maximum distance between the empirical cumulative density function (CDF) and that predicted
by the model. Non-decision time, drift rate and boundary separation were allowed to
independently vary for each congruency by previous congruency condition. Drift rate variability
and non-decision time variability were constrained to be constant across the entire task.
Responses were modeled as correct vs. incorrect (with the top boundary corresponding to
“correct” responses) allowing for 4 alternative responses to be fit with a two boundary model
(see Voss et al. 2013). This required that the bias parameter be constrained to equal 0.5 with no
associated variability parameter.
Model fits are displayed graphically in Figure 14 for the Simon task, in Figure 15 for the
Stroop task, and in Figure 16 for the flanker task. The younger adult data are in the left column
and the older adult data are on the right. From top to bottom the conditions are CC (congruentcongruent), CI (congruent-incongruent), IC (incongruent-congruent) and II (incongruentincongruent). Consistent with the approach by Donkin, Brown, and Heathcote (2011), model fit
was assessed at the group level by calculating the average quantiles within each condition across
all participants separately for each age group. These are represented by the points and standard
error bars. Quantiles predicted by the average diffusion model parameters across all participants
within the age group and graphed are presented as the dashed line within each figure. As shown,
the model does quite well in capturing the shape of the RT distribution with the predicted
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quantiles falling within one standard error of the observed RTs. There were a few exceptions of
course, notably the fit in the CI condition of the Simon task for the older adults was quite poor
(there is considerable under prediction of each RT quantile).
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Figure 14. Diffusion model fits of the Simon task in Experiment 2. Observed quantiles are
represented by the standard error bars and the predicted quantiles from the average model
parameters are represented by the dashed line.
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Figure 15. Diffusion model fits of the Stroop task in Experiment 2. Observed quantiles are
represented by the standard error bars and the predicted quantiles from the average model
parameters are represented by the dashed line
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Figure 16. Diffusion model fits of the flanker task in Experiment 2. Observed quantiles are
represented by the standard error bars and the predicted quantiles from the average model
parameters are represented by the dashed line.
Of course, these observations are based on visual assessment, however quantitative
assessment of model fit (for example using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) can be problematic
when trial numbers are large or small because the former will detect even very minor differences
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as “significant” and the latter can lack the power to detect even gross examples of misfits. Thus,
graphical examination of the data remains one of the best ways to convey and examine model
fits. Furthermore, because the major parameters (drift, boundary and non-decision time) were
each allowed to vary as a function of the conditions, absolute model fit is unlikely to be able to
improve since no further parameters could be reasonably allowed to vary across conditions. This
approach is consistent with recommendations to model fitting when the primary aim is to
understand on which model parameter a particular effect manifests (Voss et al., 2015) as was the
case in the present study.
Overall, there appear to be no systematic misfits in these data. Accuracy was consistently
over predicted but the misfit was relatively minor and all in the same direction. Therefore, the
best fitting model parameters can be examined. Given the expected task-specific influences of
previous congruency on each parameter, results will be presented separately for each parameter
across tasks (rather than the three parameters within a task) to better highlight these differences.
Before turning to the results, it is useful to recall the predictions from each of the CSE
theories. First, conflict monitoring assumes a task dissociation with previous trial effects on drift
rate for the Stroop and flanker tasks and possibly on the non-decision time parameter for the
Simon task, although a drift rate effect could be predicted there as well. Again, regardless of the
actual model based predictions, the conflict monitoring hypothesis predicts that the diffusion
model parameter that is empirically shown to index control should also show sensitivity to the
previous trial congruency. The pathway priming model assumes an effect on drift rate regardless
of task. Finally, temporal learning accounts clearly suggests a change in boundary separation
regardless of task. As already mentioned, the younger adult and older adult data were considered
separately and the younger adults shall be considered first.
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First, consider the boundary separation. The task effects for younger adults are displayed
in Figure 17. In the Simon task, the main effect of previous congruency was not significant,
F(1,35) = .82, p = .371, however there was a main effect of congruency, F(1,35) = 30.67, p <
.001, which surprisingly indicated a lower threshold on incongruent trials relative to congruent
trials. The interaction between current and previous trial congruency was not reliable, F(1,35) =
1.52, p = .226. In the Stroop task, there was a marginal main effect of previous congruency,
F(1,35) = 3.96, p = .054, but no effect of congruency, F(1,35) = 0.03, p = .864, nor was there an
interaction, F(1,35) = .507, p = .481. Finally, in flanker, neither the main effect of previous
congruency, F(1,35) = .001, p = .978, nor the main effect of congruency, F(1,35) = 1.57, p =
.219, nor the interaction, F(1,35) = .89, p = .352, were reliable. Thus, with the exception of the

Figure 17. Boundary separation estimates for each previous congruency (x-axis) by current
congruency (separate bars) for Simon (left panel), Stroop (right panel) and flanker (bottom
panel) tasks in Experiment 2 for younger adults. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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current trial congruency in the Simon task, there were no reliable effects on the boundary
separation parameter.
The effects on non-decision time are displayed in Figure 18. In the Simon task, there
were significant main effects of previous congruency, F(1,35) = 12.92, p = .001, and of current
trial congruency, F(1,35) = 197.33, p < .001, indicating longer non-decision times for both
previous incongruent and current incongruent trials, respectively. There was also a reliable
interaction, F(1,35) = 5.83, p = .021, which indicates that the increase in non-decision time from
a previous incongruent trial was significantly smaller when the current trial was also incongruent
relative to a current congruent trial. For the Stroop task, the main effect of previous congruency
was not reliable, F(1,35) = 0.57, p = .455, however there was a main effect of congruency,
F(1,35) = 24.28, p < .001, indicating longer non-decision times for current incongruent trials.
However, there was no interaction, F(1,35) = 0.33, p = .572. Similarly, in flanker, there was no
effect of previous congruency, F(1,35) = 1.60, p = .215, but a reliable effect of congruency,
F(1,35) = 91.32, p < .001, which indicates longer non-decision times for current incongruent
items and again no interaction, F(1,35) = .459, p = .502.
Finally, the effects on drift rate are shown in Figure 19. For the Simon task, there was no
effect of previous congruency, F(1,35) = 1.58, p = .217, however there was a main effect of
congruency, F(1,35) = 20.04, p < .001, indicating lower drift rates for current incongruent items,
which was further qualified by a reliable interaction, F(1,35) = 6.76, p = .014. This interaction
reflects that interference in drift rate was reduced following an incongruent trial, which is the
classic CSE finding. For the Stroop task, there was a main effect of previous congruency,
F(1,35) = 17.96, p < .001, indicating that drift rates were higher following an incongruent trial,
and a main effect of current congruency, F(1,35) = 26.72, p < .001, indicating lower overall drift
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rates for current incongruent trials, but the interaction was not reliable, F(1,35) = .073, p = .788.
In the flanker task, the main effect of previous congruency was significant, F(1,35) = 8.22, p =

Figure 19. Drift rate estimates for each previous congruency (x-axis) by current congruency
(separate bars) for Simon (left panel), Stroop (right panel) and flanker (bottom panel) tasks in
Experiment 2 for younger adults. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 18. Non-decision time estimates for each previous congruency (x-axis) by current
congruency (separate bars) for Simon (left panel), Stroop (right panel) and flanker (bottom
panel) tasks in Experiment 2 for younger adults. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
.007, which again indicates higher drift rates following incongruent trials, However, there was no
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main effect of congruency, F(1,35) = .203, p = .655, nor was there an interaction, F(1,35) = .234,
p = .631.
Before discussing the implications of these results further, I will briefly discuss the same
analyses in the older adult sample. As mentioned above, our deadlining procedure did not induce
an appreciable number of errors and thus these analyses should be treated with a great deal of
caution and are provided only for the sake of completeness.
As before, consider first the boundary separation shown in Figure 20. In the Simon task,
there was no reliable effect of previous congruency, F(1,34) = .001, p = .981, nor of congruency,
F(1,34) = .004, p = .951, nor was there an interaction, F(1,34) = .052, p = .82. Similarly, in
Stroop, there were no effects of previous congruency, F(1,34) = 1.41, p = .244, nor of
congruency, F(1,34) = .091, p = .765 and no interaction, F(1,34) = .092, p = .763. In contrast, in
the flanker task, there was a main effect of previous congruency, F(1,34) = 8.25, p = .007, which

82

indicates that thresholds increased following incongruent trials, but there was no main effect of
congruency, F(1,34) = 1.12, p = .298 nor was there an interaction, F(1,34) = 2.19, p = .147.

Figure 20. Boundary separation estimates for each previous congruency (x-axis) by current
congruency (separate bars) for Simon (left panel), Stroop (right panel) and flanker (bottom
panel) tasks in Experiment 2 for older adults. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Non-decision time effects are shown in Figure 21. In Simon, there was a marginal effect
of previous congruency, F(1,34) = 4.00, p = .05, indicating that non-decision times increased
slightly after incongruent trials. There was also a reliable main effect of congruency, F(1,34) =
234.70, p < .001, such that non-decision time was significantly longer to incongruent stimuli, but
there was no interaction, F(1,34) = 1.99, p = .17. In the Stroop task, there was no effect of
previous congruency, F(1,34) = 1.34, p = .255, but a reliable effect of congruency, F(1,34) =
81.91, p < .001, again indicating longer non-decision times to incongruent trials. There was no
interaction between these two variables, F(1,34) = .77, p = .386. In the flanker task, there were
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main effects of both previous congruency, F(1,34) = 6.27, p = .017, which indicates shorter nondecision times on previous incongruent trials, and of current congruency, F(1,34) =38.74, p <
.001, which again indicates longer non-decision times to incongruent stimuli, and there was no
interaction, F(1,34) = .468, p = .499.
Finally for drift rate, shown in Figure 22 in the Simon task, neither the main effect of
previous congruency, F(1,34) = 1.86, p = .18, nor of current congruency, F(1,34) = 1.84, p =
.184 were reliable, however there was a significant interaction, F(1,34) = 5.11, p = .03. This
interaction reflects a paradoxical effect such that interference was actually larger following an
incongruent trial which is opposite the normal finding. In the Stroop task, both the main effects
of previous congruency, F(1,34) = 5.20, p = .029, and congruency, F(1,34) = 24.21, p < .001

Figure 21. Non-decision time estimates for each previous congruency (x-axis) by current
congruency (separate bars) for Simon (left panel), Stroop (right panel) and flanker (bottom
panel) tasks in Experiment 2 for older adults. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 22. Drift rate estimates for each previous congruency (x-axis) by current congruency
(separate bars) for Simon (left panel), Stroop (right panel) and flanker (bottom panel) tasks in
Experiment 2 for older adults. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.

were reliable indicating higher drift rates for both previous and current incongruent trials. There
was also a marginal interaction, F(1,34) = 3.59, p = .067, indicating inference was significantly
smaller following an incongruent trial, as would be expected. Finally, in the flanker task, neither
of the main effects were reliable, F(1,34) = .345, p = .561, F(1,34) = 1.42, p = .241 nor was the
interaction, F(1,34) = 1.64, p = .209.
Discussion
The goal of the diffusion model analyses was to determine which component of
processing was influenced most by preceding trial characteristics. As mentioned already, the
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older adults still maintained a very high accuracy rate which possibly influenced their model fits.
For this reason, discussion will focus primarily on the younger adult data.
These analyses, although fairly complex, can be summarized with a few general points.
The first point concerns overall congruency effects (i.e., the locus of interference). At least in
these data, interference was generally reflected in two or more different parameters speaking to
multiple mechanisms required for interference resolution across tasks. Specifically, in the Simon
task, incongruent trials exhibited longer non-decision times, lower drift rates and, unexpectedly,
lower boundaries. In the Stroop task, incongruent trials had longer non-decision times and lower
drift rates whereas in flanker congruency was reflected only in drift rate. The Stroop and Simon
findings are inconsistent with the predictions of the Cohen et al. (1990) model (which predicted
an effect on drift rate only) and of the Kornblum et al. (1990) model (which predicted an effect
on non-decision time only). Of course, all parameters were allowed to vary as a function of
congruency and thus, at least some of these effects might be simply fitting noise inherent to the
data. However, it is equally likely that task performance in complex attention tasks (which
include remembering key mappings as well as resolving interference, among other things) are
not easily accommodated by an unembellished form of the diffusion model and thus require
multiple parameters to adequately fit the data.
However, even with this caveat in mind, it is still possible to investigate the CSE on
model parameters. Importantly, although only one of the tasks showed a reliable CSE in mean
RTs (the Simon task), the Stroop task also showed a reliable CSE on accuracy. Again it is a key
strength of the diffusion model that combines accuracy and RT to allow for inference regarding
underlying processes.
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Looking first at the Simon task, there was evidence for the CSE to manifest on both nondecision time and the drift rate. The effect on drift rate was in a direction that one would expect.
Specifically, congruent-congruent sequences exhibited a higher drift rate than incongruentcongruent sequences and incongruent-incongruent sequences exhibited higher drifts than
congruent-incongruent sequences. This pattern can be accommodated by the conflict monitoring
account. Specifically, conflict on incongruent trials induces an increase in control (here reflected
in drift rate) for the following trial. The increase in control boosts drift rate for incongruent trials
but lowers it for congruent trials where the irrelevant dimension is consistent with the
appropriate response.
However, the CSE was not isolated to the drift rate and indeed the previous by current
trial interaction also appeared on the non-decision time. However, this interaction was somewhat
paradoxical. Specifically, non-decision times were longer on post-incongruent trials overall but
the increase was smaller for incongruent trials. An increase in non-decision time from congruentincongruent sequences to incongruent-incongruent sequences cannot explain why the pattern of
means in the mean RTs are reversed, namely that mean RTs for incongruent-incongruent trials
are faster than for congruent-incongruent trials. Thus, it is cannot be the case that this interaction
is driving the mean RT effects.
The analysis was unable to statistically detect a CSE in model parameters for either the
Stroop or the flanker task. There was, however, a main effect of previous trial congruency in the
drift rate for both tasks, such that the drift rate uniformly increased following incongruent trials.
Again, such a parameterization alone cannot account for the cross-over interaction in mean RTs.
In order to produce that interaction for the mean RTs, the previous congruency main effects
would have to interact with a congruency effect on a different parameter. While such a
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formulation is certainly possible, it was not predicted a priori and thus overly strong conclusions
should not be drawn from these analyses.
Additional Issues regarding the Diffusion Model
The results from the diffusion model analysis suggest either that the congruency sequence
effect is too subtle to be detected with our current sample size or that the diffusion model (in its
unembellished form) is not capable of adequately describing performance in these complex
attention tasks. Before reaching such a conclusion, several additional issues need to be
addressed. First, it has been suggested that the full diffusion model is much too complex, with
too many free parameters, to be applied to relatively small datasets (as in the current study). It
has been further suggested that a simpler model, the EZ diffusion model (Wagenmakers, van der
Maas, & Grasman, 2007), which calculates the major model parameters (drift rate, boundary
separation and non-decision) from overall accuracy, mean RT and variance of correct responses,
is better able to detect condition differences across subjects (van Ravenzwaaij, Donkin, &
Vandekerckhove, submitted). There are of course some limitations and issues with the EZ
approach (see Ratcliff, (2008) for discussion). However, in order to be sure the fitting method
chosen here was not biasing the results, the EZ method was also applied to the young adult data
from Experiment 2.
At least with respect to the CSE, the EZ analysis returned the same results as those from
full model recovered by fast-dm. Specifically, the interaction between current and previous trial
congruency was only reliable in the Simon task and only on non-decision time and the drift rate
(ps < .01), with the patterns of means in the same direction as previously observed. This suggests
that the choice of the model (EZ vs. fast-dm) is not impacting the results in this Experiment.
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The issue of statistical power can also be partially addressed in two ways. First, the data
from Experiment 2 can be run together with age group as a factor effectively doubling the
sample size. The second approach would be to combine the young adult data from Experiments 1
and 2 and run an analysis with “experiment” as a between subjects factor. Each approach has its
own set of issues, but as long as there is no statistically significant interaction with age or
experiment, the lower-order interaction of previous by current trial congruency can be
(cautiously) interpreted. The goal of course is to determine whether small effects on boundary
separation (or some other parameter) can be detected with a larger sample size.
First, using age as a factor in Experiment 2, ANOVAs again revealed the same patterns
as described previously. Specifically, the only evidence for a CSE was in the Simon task and it
appeared on non-decision time (p = .012) and drift rate (p < .001), in the same direction as in the
young adults only analysis. The 3-way interaction among age, previous trial congruency and
current trial congruency was not significant on any parameter for any of the tasks.
Looking now at the young adult data across Experiments 1 and 2, a similar story was
revealed. Once again the only task which showed any reliable CSE was Simon. Now, however,
the interaction manifested on non-decision time (p < .001) and drift rate (p < .001) and also on
boundary separation (p = .05). The pattern of means for the former two parameters were
unchanged from the main analysis. The small interaction in the boundary separation was in a
direction opposite what would be expected. Specifically, CC trials had a higher threshold (M =
1.126, SE = .023) than IC trials (M = 1.097, SE = .026) and II trials had a higher threshold (M =
.991, SE = .023) than CI trials (M = .975, SE = .022). There was never a higher-order interaction
among “experiment”, previous and current trial congruency.
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Another concern might be raised regarding the choice of free parameters in the model.
Specifically, boundary separation, drift rate and non-decision time were all allowed to vary as a
function of previous and current trial congruency. A congruency effect on the non-decision time
parameter was hypothesized based on interpretation of the Kornblum et al. (1990) model. It is, of
course, possible that this interpretation is incorrect and that all effects should be constrained to
the decision process (i.e., drift rate and boundary separation). If non-decision time is allowed to
vary when it doesn’t need to, the model may be trying to over-fit the data, giving rise to effects
that are not really there and masking others that are.
To address this concern, the young adult data from Experiment 2 were refit to the
diffusion model but this time with non-decision time held constant across all conditions within a
task. Despite this adjustment to the model, there was only a single significant CSE, again on the
Simon task in drift rate (p = .004). The pattern of means was in the expected direction, CC trials
(M = 4.41, SE = .21) were higher than IC trials (M = 4.13, SE = .26) and II trials (M = 3.87, SE
= .24) were higher than CI trials (M = 3.14, SE = .22). Thus, the effects reported previously do
not appear to be due to parameter tradeoffs induced by allowing too many free parameters to
vary in the model.
In summary, the conclusions to be drawn from this analysis are unfortunately limited
given the inability to detect a CSE on underlying model parameters. What can be said with a
reasonable degree of certainty is that boundary separation was not responsible for cross trial
adjustments in any task as that parameter was not sensitive to either the main effect of previous
congruency nor was there an interaction with current trial congruency. Thus, building on
Experiment 1, it seems that the temporal learning hypothesis can be eliminated as an explanatory
mechanism for the CSE, at least in younger adults.
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Experiment 3
Given the limited ability of the diffusion model to discriminate between the pathway
priming and conflict monitoring accounts, Experiment 3 was designed to experimentally test
these two models. To reiterate, the conflict monitoring account suggests that it is the conflict (or
lack thereof) on the preceding trial that drives cross-trial changes. In contrast, the priming
account suggests that it is the utility of the irrelevant dimension that is critical. As outlined in the
introduction, the utility of the irrelevant dimension can be manipulated by introducing a
contingency bias. Specifically, by creating stimuli on which the to be ignored dimension (word
information in the case of the Stroop task), predicts the correct response more often than chance.
For example, in a four item Stroop paradigm with 9 incongruent stimuli (3 presentations in each
color) and 9 congruent items, the word predicts the correct response 9 out of 18 times (50%),
whereas chance presentation would be 25%. As previously noted, this has been a major confound
in studies of the CSE thus far. Therefore, for present purposes, a contingency bias refers to any
item for which the word predicts the correct response at greater than chance levels.
Although the goal of this experiment was to contrast these two theories, it is also possible
that younger and older adults are tracking different characteristics of stimuli that differentially
drive cross-trial changes. Recall that one of the most striking findings from Experiment 1 was
that older adults showed larger CSEs relative to the younger participants in the Stroop task. This
is consistent perhaps with older adults utilizing pathway priming mechanisms, but does not
imply that younger adults are engaging in this process as well. In other words, it is possible that
older adults’ cross-trial effects are due to pathway priming but younger adults’ changes are due
to incremental changes in control due to conflict. The present experiment will be able to test this
possibility.
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Experiment 3 utilized stimuli that contained both conflicting information (i.e.,
congruency) as well as a contingency manipulation to adjudicate between these two theories. To
create stimuli that varied both in conflict and contingency, I relied on the item specific
proportion congruency effect (Jacoby, Lindsay, & Hessels, 2003). The ISPC effect is the finding
that participants exhibit greater interference to items that are frequently congruent (mostly
congruent items: MC) compared to items that are frequently incongruent (mostly incongruent
items: MI). Initial theorizing regarding this effect involved attributing the phenomenon to a rapid
retrieval of abstract control settings post stimulus onset (Blais, Robidoux, Risko, & Besner,
2007). That is, the amount of word processing can be increased for mostly congruent items
(since the word is often the correct answer) and can be decreased for mostly incongruent items.
Importantly, this occurs at the item level. However, these explanations are typically confounded
with simple associative learning processes, especially when there are only two response options.
For example, if RED and BLUE are a pair of items and RED is a mostly incongruent item such
that it frequently appears in the color blue and infrequently in the color red, a participant could
learn that upon reading the word RED it is best to respond with the answer “blue”. In this
scenario, no control over conflicting information is required.
The relative contributions of each of these mechanisms to the ISPC has been the subject
of much debate (Bugg, 2012). However, for the purposes of the present research, the exact
mechanism that is operating is relatively unimportant. Instead I rely simply on the fact that a)
interference is smaller for one set of items than in the other (suggesting that perceived conflict
should also be smaller) and b) when only two response options are used there is a reliable
stimulus –response association which in turn makes the irrelevant dimension useful on all trials.
Thus, perceived conflict was manipulated via the induction of a contingency bias.
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To achieve this goal, a larger stimulus set was needed than was used for the first two
experiments and in order to reduce memory demands (i.e., mapping colors to keys) the present
experiment used a vocal response rather than the button press design of the first two experiments.
An example of the stimuli frequencies is shown in Table 17. A total of eight colors were used
which were split into pairs as in the prior two experiments. The color pairs were always the same
(red with blue, white with purple, orange with green and black with yellow) but they were
rotated across the various conditions. In this example, RED and BLUE were designated as the
“critical” items which were the items for which the CSE will be assessed. These items were
constructed in a similar manner as the prior two experiments, namely controlling for cross trial
repetition confounds as well as any contingency biases at least on these critical items. WHITE
and PURPLE were MC items (the word occurred in the corresponding color the majority of the
time), ORANGE and GREEN were MI items (the word occurred in the opposite color the
majority of the time) and finally, BLACK and YELLOW were “neutral” items (50% congruent).
This set up allows for the examination of the CSE for the critical trials as a function of the
preceding congruency as well as the preceding item type (i.e., the contingency bias) while
maintaining the strict control over various confounds that was achieved earlier. Thus, the critical
CSE items could follow a MC item, an MI item or a neutral item. Examination of how the CSE
changes following each item type is of primary interest in these analyses.
The predictions are as follows: If responses adjustments in the Stroop task are being
made due to perceived conflict, a linear scaling of the CSE across item types should be observed.
Specifically, conflict should be highest for the MC items, which should lead to greater reductions
in the interference effect on stimuli that follow the MC items, compared to stimuli that follow MI
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COLOR

Table 16. Stimuli Frequencies used in Experiment 3.

RED
BLUE
WHITE
PURPLE
ORANGE
GREEN
BLACK
YELLOW

RED

BLUE

96
96

96
96

WHITE

32
96

WORD
PURPLE ORANGE

GREEN

BLACK

YELLOW

64
64

64
64

96
32
96
32

32
96

items. This is because the MI condition should produce relatively low levels of conflict. In
contrast, if cross trial adjustments are being made based on pathway utility, the CSE should be
equal across MC and MI conditions because in both cases the irrelevant dimension can be useful
for making a response. Both conditions should be different from the “neutral” condition in which
the irrelevant dimension does not reliably predict the correct response. Furthermore, if older
adults are sensitive to different aspects of the stimuli (i.e., if younger adults are tracking conflict
and older adults are tracking contingency), one would expect an age by CSE by item type
interaction.
Method
Participants. Thirty-two younger and 32 older adults were recruited from the same
sources as the previous two experiments. Younger adults participated for course credit or
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monetary reimbursement ($15) and older adults received monetary compensation only ($25).
Demographic information on these participants are presented in Table 18.

Table 17. Demographic characteristics of the participants in Experiment 3.
Younger
Older
N
32
32
Age
19.69 (1.45)
72.66 (4.33)
Education
13.48 (2.73)
17.38 (3.42)
Short Blessed Test
NA
.94 (1.68)
CompSpan
14.13 (6.66)
NA
CVOE RT
606 (72)
958 (193)
Note: CompSpan = Total number of correct recall trials on the computation span task.
The Short Blessed Test ranges from 0-28, with a score of 4 or less indicative of normal
cognition. CVOE RT in the mean response time to correct trials in the ConsonantVowel Odd- Even Paradigm.
Materials and Procedure. After consenting to the experiment, individuals completed a
short demographics questionnaire and older adults completed the Short Blessed Test as a
screener for dementia. The modified Stroop task was then immediately administered.
Participants first completed a “demonstration” block during which the 8 color words used in the
task were shown in their corresponding colors (e.g., RED in red). This was to insure each
participant could identify them as the intended colors.
Then, a 23 item practice block was administered which mimicked the structure of the test
design. That is, mostly congruent items were shown in their corresponding color more frequently
than in their opposing color and vice versa for MI items. During the practice block, participants
were given corrective feedback as necessary (e.g., “speak more loudly”, “move closer to the
microphone”, “remember to name the color not the word” etc.). After the practice block, the test
itself began. There were a total of 1152 test trials split into 15 blocks. Rest breaks were
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encouraged in between each block but were not required. An experimenter remained in the room
for the entire task and coded each response made by the participant. If the participant stuttered or
the microphone triggered early (e.g., if the participant inhaled loudly for breath) or triggered late
(e.g., if the participant spoke too quietly), this was coded as a microphone error. After the
experimenter coded the response, a short ITI of 1 second was initiated prior to the onset of the
next trial.
After the Stroop task was completed, all participants completed the CVOE task to
measure processing speed and the younger adults also completed the computation span task to
measure working memory. Due to the length and time requirements of the task, especially for the
older adults, no further tasks were given and older adults did not complete the working memory
assessment.
Results
Reaction time and error rates were analyzed in the same manner as the previous
experiments. However, since the present task was a vocal Stroop task, further screening
procedures were required. Specifically, microphone errors were first removed and never
analyzed. Second, RTs faster than 200 ms or slower than 5 seconds were removed followed by
any RT greater than 3 standard deviations from the participant’s mean. Finally, any trial
occurring after a break or after an error trial was also removed. These procedures removed 7% of
the total trials for each age group. Detailed analysis of the percentage of trials trimmed per group
and condition can be found in Appendix C. Finally, only correct RTs were retained for the
reaction time analysis. As before, RTs were analyzed with LME with log-transformed RT as the
dependent variable and random intercepts across subjects and random slopes for congruency
included. Accuracy was similarly analyzed using GLME. As opposed to Experiments 1 and 2,
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which contained only two levels of a given factor, Experiment 3 contains a factor that has 3
levels (item-type: MC vs. MI vs. Neutral), the significance of the overall variable (i.e., item type)
was first assessed using a Wald Chi-square test with Type III sums of squares using the Anova
function in the car package (Fox & Weisberg, 2011), with follow-up comparisons of significant
effects being conducted as necessary.
ISPC Analysis. First, I analyzed whether the ISPC manipulation had the desired effect,
namely to reduce interference for MI items. To that end, the RTs and errors for all trials except
for the “critical” trials were analyzed. Age group (coded as -0.5 / 0.5 contrasts), congruency
(coded as -0.5 / 0.5 contrasts) and item type (MC vs. MI vs. Neutral, dummy coded with MC list
as the reference group) were included as factors as well as all the two and three-way interactions.
Condition means and associated confidence intervals are presented in Table 19.
As expected, this analysis yielded a main effect of age, χ2(1) = 33.64, p < .0001,
indicating the older adults were slower than the younger. There was also a main effect of
congruency, χ2(1) = 707.94, p < .0001, indicating slower responses to the incongruent items.
Finally, the main effect of item type was significant, χ2(2) = 26.93, p < .0001, indicating slowest
responses to the MC items and faster responses to the MI items. More importantly, there was a
significant congruency by item type interaction, χ2(2) = 335.48, p < .0001, indicating that
interference changed across the item types (i.e., there was an ISPC effect). Follow up
comparisons of this interaction indicated that MC items exhibited significantly more interference
than the MI items, β = -.09, t = -18.30, p < .0001, as well as the neutral items, β = -.05, t = -9.36,
p < .0001, as expected. Furthermore, the MI items exhibited smaller interference than the neutral
items, β = -.049, t = -10.24, p < .0001. Finally, although there was an age by item type
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interaction, χ2(2) = 8.02, p < .0001, indicating that older adults were slowed more than younger
adults to the neutral items compared to the MC or MI items, but there was no interaction among
age, congruency and item type, χ2(2) = 0.39, p = .82, indicating equal ISPC effects across
younger and older adults, consistent with prior findings (Bugg, 2014b).
Mean accuracy rates are shown in Table 20. Estimated accuracy (95% CIs) for each ISPC
condition in Experiment 3. and overall were again quite high. The LME analysis revealed main
effects of age, χ2(1) = 6.98, p = .008, indicating higher accuracy for the older adults, and of

Table 18. Estimated Mean RTs (95% CIs) of the ISPC effect in Experiment 3.
Younger Adults
MC

MI

Cong

6.36 (6.31-6.4)

6.39 (6.34-6.43)

Incong

6.56 (6.51-6.6)

6.49 (6.45-6.54)

0.200

0.109

SI

Older Adults
Neutral

MC

MI

Neutral

6.36 (6.32-6.41)

6.52 (6.48-6.56)

6.56 (6.51-6.6)

6.54 (6.5-6.59)

6.52 (6.48-6.56)

6.74 (6.7-6.79)

6.69 (6.64-6.73)

6.72 (6.68-6.76)

0.226

0.129

0.178

0.158

Back Transformed Means
MC

MI

Neutral

MC

MI

Neutral

Cong

576 (551-601)

593 (568-619)

580 (556-606)

678 (649-707)

704 (674-735)

694 (665-725)

Incong

703 (673-735)

661 (633-690)

679 (650-709)

849 (813-887)

801 (767-836)

829 (794-866)

127

68

99

172

97

135

SI

Note. MC = Mostly congruent items, MI = mostly incongruent items, Neutral = 50% congruent items. SI
= Stroop Interference. Top panel = log-transformed estimates and bottom panel = back-transformed RTs
in milliseconds.
congruency, χ2(1) = 229.80, p < .0001, indicating higher accuracy for congruent items. There
was also an interaction between congruency and item type, χ2(2) = 33.28, p < .0001, again
indicating larger interference effects for the MC items compared to the MI items, β = 1.31, z =

98

5.35, p < .0001, and the neutral items, β = .94, t = 4.36, p < .0001. No other interactions were
significant.
In summary, the ISPC manipulation had the desired effect, that is there was a change in
the interference effect as a function of item contingency, even while holding the list-wide
congruency constant at 50%. The important question now is how these items impacted

Table 19. Estimated accuracy (95% CIs) for each ISPC condition in Experiment 3.
Younger Adults
Cong
Incong
SI

Older Adults

MC

MI

Neutral

MC

MI

Neutral

0.99 (0.99-1)

0.99 (0.99-0.99)

0.99 (0.99-0.99)

1 (1-1)

0.99 (0.99-1)

1 (0.99-1)

0.95 (0.93-0.96)

0.98 (0.97-0.98)

0.97 (0.96-0.97)

0.97 (0.95-0.98)

0.99 (0.98-0.99)

0.98 (0.97-0.99)

0.05

0.02

0.03

0.03

0.01

0.01

Note. MC = Mostly congruent items, MI = mostly incongruent items, Neutral = 50% congruent items. SI
= Stroop Interference.

performance on subsequent “critical” trials.
CSE RT Analysis. The CSE on critical items were analyzed using LME models. Age,
current congruency, and previous congruency were entered as factors identical to the previous
experiments. It is important to note that “item type” refer to the previous trial (i.e., was the prior
trial an MC, MI or neutral item). The current trials for these analyses were all 50% congruent.
The critical question is whether the CSE was modulated by the item type of the previous trial in
addition to the congruency of that trial.
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Table 21. ANOVA table of the CSE analysis of the critical items in Experiment 3.
Effect

Chi Square

Df

p-value

299.22

1

< .0001

Table
CIs) for 1critical
items in Experiment 3.
Age 20. Condition means (95%
24.44
< .0001
Congruency (C)

PC
4.33
1
0.037
Younger Adults
Item Type
2.45
2
0.294
MC Items
MI Items
Age * C
2.29
1
0.130
PC
PI16.18
PI
Age * PC
1
< PC
.0001
Cong
6.36 (6.31-6.41)
6.4 (6.35-6.46)
6.4 (6.34-6.45)
Age * Item
Type
0.18
26.36 (6.31-6.41)
0.916
Incong 6.52 (6.46-6.57) 6.53 (6.48-6.58)
6.51 (6.46-6.57) 6.52 (6.47-6.57)
CSE
10.42
1
0.001
SI
0.15
0.12
0.15
0.12
C * item type
0.53
2
0.769
CSE
-0.03
-0.03
PC * Item Type
3.16
2
0.206
Cong
580 (552-611)
605 (575-637)
580 (552-611)
599 (570-631)
Age * CSE
0.03
1
0.857
Incong
676 (642-711)
683 (649-719)
675 (641-710)
678 (644-714)
Age * C * Item Type
0.11
2
0.948
SI
96
79
94
79
Age * PC * Item Type
14.62
2
0.001
CSE
-17
-16
CSE * Item Type
0.53
2
0.769
Older Adults
Age * CSE * Item Type
0.51
2
0.775
Note: C = current trial
congruency, PC = previous trial MI Items
MC Items
congruency, PC
Item Type = the ISPC
PI status of the previous
PC
PI
item,
CSE
=
the
C
*
PC
interaction
Cong
6.54 (6.49-6.59)
6.55 (6.5-6.6)
6.52 (6.47-6.57) 6.56 (6.51-6.61)
Incong
SI

Neutral Items
PC

PI

6.51 (6.46-6.56)

6.52 (6.47-6.57)

6.39 (6.34-6.44)

6.54 (6.49-6.59)

0.14

0.13
-0.02

583 (554-614)

597 (567-628)

673 (639-708)

676 (643-712)

89

80
-9
Neutral Items

PC

PI

6.52 (6.47-6.57)

6.56 (6.51-6.61)

6.72 (6.67-6.77)

6.7 (6.65-6.75)

6.71 (6.66-6.76)

6.71 (6.66-6.76)

6.7 (6.65-6.75)

6.71 (6.66-6.76)

0.18

0.15

0.19

0.15

0.18

0.15

CSE

-0.03

-0.04

-0.03

Cong

694 (660-731)

698 (663-734)

681 (647-716)

705 (670-742)

681 (647-717)

708 (673-745)

Incong

829 (787-872)

811 (770-853)

820 (779-863)

818 (777-861)

812 (772-855)

820 (779-863)

113

139

113

131

SI

134

CSE

-21

-26

112
-20

Note: MC = mostly congruent items, MI = mostly incongruent items, Neutral = 50% congruent items, PC = previous
congruent trial, PI = previous incongruent trials, Cong = current congruent trial, Incong = current incongruent trial,
SI = Stroop interference, CSE = congruency sequence effect. Log transformed RTs are in the top rows and backtransformed means are below.

Estimated means as a function of age, congruency, previous congruency and previous
item type are displayed in Table 21, and the full ANOVA table is shown in Table 22.
Highlighting first the primary effects of interest, there was evidence for a reliable CSE,
specifically that interference was consistently reduced following incongruent trials compared to
congruent trials. However, in the present design, this effect did not interact with age nor,
surprisingly, did it interact with the previous item type. This suggests that the modulations of
conflict revealed in the ISPC analysis were not differentially modulating cross trial adjustments
100

as assessed on these critical items. Furthermore, the age by CSE by item type interaction was not
reliable.
CSE Accuracy Analysis. Estimated condition means for the accuracy analysis are shown
in Table 23. These analyses revealed a main effect of age, χ2(1) = 5.87, p = .02, and a main effect
of congruency, χ2(1) = 32.52, p < .0001. There was also an interaction between age and
congruency, χ2(1) = 4.53, p =.03, indicating larger interference effects for the younger adults, as
well as an age by CSE interaction, χ2(1) = 4.46, p = .03. This latter interaction indicates cross
trial changes were significantly larger in the younger adults. Of course, accuracy rates were
overall quite high and thus should be interpreted with caution. As with the RT analysis, there was

Table 22. Estimated accuracy (95% CIs) of the critical items in Experiment 3.
Younger Adults
MC Items

MI Items

Neutral Items

PC

PI

PC

PI

PC

PI

Cong

0.99 (0.99-1)

0.99 (0.98-0.99)

1 (0.99-1)

0.99 (0.99-1)

1 (0.99-1)

0.99 (0.99-1)

InCong

0.97 (0.95-0.98)

0.98 (0.97-0.99)

0.96 (0.94-0.97)

0.98 (0.96-0.98)

0.96 (0.94-0.97)

0.97 (0.96-0.98)

SI

0.026

0.004

0.035

0.018

0.035

0.021

CSE

-0.023

-0.017

-0.013

Older Adults
MC Items

MI Items

Neutral Items

PC

PI

PC

PI

PC

PI

Cong

1 (0.99-1)

1 (0.99-1)

1 (0.99-1)

1 (0.99-1)

1 (0.99-1)

1 (0.99-1)

InCong

0.98 (0.97-0.99)

0.98 (0.97-0.99)

0.98 (0.97-0.99)

0.98 (0.97-0.99)

0.99 (0.98-0.99)

0.99 (0.98-0.99)

SI

0.015

0.016

0.016

0.019

0.008

0.008

CSE

0.002

0.004

0.000

Note: PC = previous congruent trial, PI = previous incongruent trial, cong = current congruent trial,
InCong = current incongruent trial, SI = Stroop interference (incongruent RT – congruent RT), CSE =
congruency sequence effect
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no evidence that the CSE interacted with the item type of the preceding trial and no other main
effects or interactions were reliable.
Interim Discussion
Somewhat surprisingly, despite a significant modulation of the interference effect due to
the ISPC manipulation, these changes in conflict did not carry over to the subsequent congruency
effect. Indeed, although the congruency of the previous trial did modulate interference on the
current trial (i.e., there was a CSE), this modulation was independent of the preceding item type5.
It is always difficult to interpret a null effect such as this, however, a pseudo-replication
of these findings can be performed by examining the CSE on the ISPC items themselves (i.e., the
MC or MI items), which were previously excluded from analysis. If the same results are found as
in the initial analysis (i.e., no interaction between the CSE and item type), one can have greater
confidence in this additivity. Of course, any such replication will only be partial because the
differential interference as a function of the ISPC manipulation now occurs on the current trial
rather than the previous trial.
CSE analysis of RTs on ISPC items. It should be noted that this analysis was not
planned a priori and therefore cross-trial repetitions were not explicitly controlled. However,
given the number of possible stimuli in this design, such exact repetitions should be relatively

5

I further tested the additivity of these effects in a few different ways. First, since the task was very long (1152
trials) I analyzed only the first 200 trials of the task to make sure the task length was not influencing our results.
This analysis again revealed no interaction between the CSE and the previous item type (p = .54) nor of the
higher order interaction with age (p=.53). I also split the sample based on the overall effect size of the CSE and
only analyzed the individuals who exhibited a CSE greater than the median of their age group to make sure our
additive effects were not a consequence of the small effect size. However, once again the interaction between
the CSE and the previous item type was not reliable (p = .61) nor was there the higher order interaction with age
(p = .17).
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rare. With that in mind, an LME analysis using age, congruency, previous congruency and item
type as factors was conducted just as in the previous analysis. Again, in this case, “item type”
now refers to the item type of the current (as opposed to the previous) trial.

Table 23. Estimated Mean RTs (95% CIs) for the CSE analysis of the ISPC items in Experiment 3.

Younger Adults
MC Items

MI Items

Neutral Items

Log-Transformed Means
PC

PI

PC

PI

PC

PI

Cong

6.33 (6.29-6.38)

6.38 (6.33-6.42)

6.38 (6.34-6.43)

6.39 (6.34-6.43)

6.34 (6.3-6.39)

6.38 (6.34-6.43)

InCong

6.55 (6.5-6.59)

6.56 (6.52-6.61)

6.5 (6.46-6.55)

6.48 (6.44-6.53)

6.53 (6.48-6.57)

6.51 (6.47-6.56)

0.21

0.19

0.12

0.10

0.18

0.13

SI
CSE

-0.03

-0.02

-0.05

Back Transformed Means
Cong

563 (539-588)

589 (564-615)

592 (567-619)

593 (568-620)

569 (545-594)

592 (567-618)

InCong

697 (666-728)

710 (679-742)

667 (639-697)

655 (627-684)

684 (655-715)

674 (645-704)

134

121

75

62

115

82

SI
CSE

-13

-13

-33

Older Adults
MC Items

MI Items

Neutral Items

Log-Transformed Means
PC

PI

PC

PI

PC

PI

Cong

6.5 (6.46-6.54)

6.54 (6.5-6.58)

6.56 (6.51-6.6)

PC

6.52 (6.48-6.57)

6.56 (6.52-6.6)

InCong

6.75 (6.71-6.79)

6.74 (6.69-6.78)

6.7 (6.66-6.74)

6.67 (6.63-6.71)

6.72 (6.68-6.77)

6.72 (6.67-6.76)

0.25

0.20

0.14

0.11

0.20

0.16

SI
CSE

-0.05

-0.03

-0.05

Back-Transformed Means
Cong

665 (637-694)

692 (662-722)

704 (674-737)

703 (672-735)

681 (651-711)

707 (677-738)

InCong

854 (817-893)

844 (807-883)

813 (778-849)

788 (755-823)

833 (797-870)

825 (790-862)

189

153

108

86

152

119

SI
CSE

-37

-23

-33

Note. Cong and InCong refer to the current trial congruency, PC and PI refer to previous congruent and
previous incongruent trials respectively. The CSE is the difference in interference across previous trial
types.
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Model derived mean RT estimates are provided in Table 24 and the ANOVA table in
Table 25. As shown, even when conditionalized on the previous trial, the analyses are largely
similar to the initial analyses reported above. Specifically, there was a highly robust CSE as well
as a congruency by item type interaction, indicating that interference was highest for the MC
items and lowest for the MI items. However, in these analyses, this effect differed slightly based
on the congruency of the preceding trial, that is there was a CSE by item type interaction. This
reflects a smaller CSE for the MI items compared to the neutral items β = .026, t = -2.71, p =
.007, but was not different from the MC items. The neutral and MC items themselves did not

Table 24. ANOVA table for the CSE analysis of the ISPC items in Experiment 3.
Effect
Age

Chi Square
33.74

Df
1

p-value
< .0001

709.04
38.39
28.28

1
1
2

< .0001
< .0001
< .0001

Age * Congruency
Age * PC
Age * Item Type

2.54
6.09
7.25

1
1
2

0.111
0.014
0.027

CSE

27.96

1

< .0001

C * item type
PC * Item Type
Age * CSE
Age * C * Item Type
Age * PC * Item Type
CSE * Item Type
Age * CSE * Item Type

334.49
52.10
2.80
0.30
4.32
7.33
2.73

2
2
1
2
2
2
2

< .0001
< .0001
0.094
0.860
0.115
0.026
0.255

Congruency
PC
Item Type

Note: C = current trial congruency, PC = previous trial congruency, Item type = MC, MI or
neutral items
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differ (ps > .16). Finally, there was no evidence for the highest order age by CSE by item type
interaction6.
Discussion
Experiment 3 was designed to better determine the precise characteristics of the
preceding stimulus which prompt adjustments in control for the following trial in the context of
the Stroop task. The manipulations were successful in creating stimuli that varied in the
interference produced via the well-established ISPC manipulation (Jacoby et al. 2003). If
individuals modulate their response dynamics based on the relative magnitude of perceived
conflict, one would expect a linear scaling of the CSE across MI items (low interference) to MC
items (high interference). In contrast, the pathway priming account predicted equal CSEs in the
MI and MC conditions due to the experimentally induced S-R association. That is, the word
information could be relied upon on the majority of trials in the MC condition or used to retrieve
the opposite response in the MI condition. Thus, the CSE in these trials would be expected to be
larger than the neutral condition, which does not contain biased utility, because the word
pathway should have been utilized to a greater extent on MC and MI items.
Surprisingly, neither of these hypotheses were borne out. Specifically, although there was
evidence for a highly reliable CSE, this effect did not vary as a function of the preceding item
type. Although there was a reliable CSE by ISPC interaction in the secondary analysis, it did not
follow either of the a priori predicted patterns. These results are surprising in light of both the

6

The same analyses were conducted on the accuracy rates to these items which revealed a significant CSE, χ2(1) =
6.57, p = .01, and a congruency by item type interaction (the ISPC effect), χ2(1) = 31.70, p < .0001. However, the
CSE did not differ as a function of age (p = .55) nor as a function of item type (p = .39).
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conflict monitoring account and the pathway priming account. One might expect the magnitude
of the CSE to change with overall interference based on conflict monitoring and to change with
overall pathway utility (i.e., a difference between the biased items and the neutral items) based
on pathway priming. The fact that the CSE did not interact with the previous item type (which
produced differential interference as revealed by the ISPC analysis) suggests that whatever
mechanism is responsible for reducing interference for the MI items relative to MC items
(producing the ISPC) it is independent from the mechanism involved in local, cross-trial changes
(producing the CSE), possibly hinting at multiple levels of dynamic control operating in the
Stroop task.
If the CSE truly reflects a relatively isolated control phenomenon, one would expect it to
also be additive with other manipulations know to produce variations in cognitive control. For
example, although this is to my knowledge, the first study to investigate modulation of the CSE
as a function of item-specific congruency manipulations, other researchers have examined the
contributions of list-wide proportion manipulations to the CSE magnitude. The list-wide
proportion congruency effect (LWPC) refers to the finding that interference is lower when the
majority of the items within a list are incongruent compared to when most of the items are
congruent (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979). This effect falls naturally from the conflict monitoring
framework in that control for the MI list is constantly kept at a high level due to the frequent
conflict. In contrast, for mostly MC lists, control can be relaxed due to the relatively infrequent
occurrence of conflicting information.
One might expect, therefore, the CSE would be larger in MC lists where control would
need to be locally increased to deal with the conflict on an incongruent trial compared to an MI
list where control is already maintained at a relatively high level. Unfortunately, the available
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literature regarding this hypothesis has been fairly mixed, possibly due to the range of different
tasks that were used and individual differences measures that were obtained. For example,
Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, and Sommer (2002) used a Simon task and varied the
proportion of congruent items from 20% to 50% to 80%. Their analyses showed a reliable
interaction among congruency frequency, current congruency and previous congruency (p = .03).
In other words, the CSE interacted with the LWPC in their data. However, this seems to be
driven by differences in the 50% condition (CSE = 66 ms) compared to the MC condition (CSE
= 103 ms) and the MI condition (CSE = 106). If CSE differences are due to the changes in global
conflict, one would expect the biggest effects to manifest between the MC and MI lists.
Similarly, Purmann, Badde, and Wendt, (2009) also found the same interaction using a flanker
task with the CSE indeed being larger in the MC list as expected. However, the differences in the
CSE as a function of LWPC was only 3 ms, suggesting the effect, although clearly detectable, is
really quite small.
Two studies have examined the interaction of the LWPC and CSE in the context of a
Stroop paradigm. Using a highly modified version of the task, Hutchison (2011) found a
significant CSE by LWPC interaction, however the interaction was such that the CSE was
smaller in the MC list (and in the wrong direction, i.e., interference was larger following
incongruent trials rather than smaller), which is clearly not a standard finding. Furthermore, this
effect only held for individuals who were relatively low in working memory capacity and no
differences emerged for the high span participants. In a more standard implementation of Stroop
paradigm, Meier and Kane (2013) showed no evidence for the CSE by LWPC interaction
suggesting that Hutchison’s results may be due to the specific modifications inherent to his
design.
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Thus, the link between global (LWPC) and local (CSE) adjustments in control remains
elusive and may depend highly on the type of task that is utilized. Although surprising, such
findings can possibly be reconciled within the dual mechanisms of cognitive control framework
(Braver et al., 2007) which posits a proactive form of control by which top-down control is
continuously maintained over the conflicting information, and a reactive form of control which
retrieves control settings or possibly S-R associations to resolve interference post-stimulus onset.
Arguably, the LWPC effect reflects the proactive form of control and the CSE might be
considered to be relatively reactive (i.e., conflict was perceived now an adjustment is made). If
such processes are indeed independent, then additivity of these factors would be expected. Of
course, this relies on the assumption that the CSE reflects a reactive form of control, which may
not be the case. Indeed, the pattern of age effects in Experiments 1 and 2 suggests that the CSE
might actually be the result of multiple distinct processes.
Furthermore, more standard measures of proactive and reactive control do not appear to
be strictly independent. Consider again the ISPC, which was manipulated in the current study.
As outlined in the motivation for this experiment, the ISPC can be conceived of as either a rapid
retrieval of control settings post-stimulus onset or the learning and utilization of reliable stimulus
to response associations. In either case, this mechanism would necessarily have to be reactive
since there is no way to know which response to retrieve until the stimulus was presented. One
can therefore ask the question if proactive and reactive forms of control are independent by
determining whether the LWPC interacts with the ISPC.
Bugg (2014a) conducted such a study and provided evidence that top-down control is
only engaged when bottom-up (reactive) processes are not useful. Specifically, in an experiment
in which reliable S-R associations were created, she found no evidence for a LWPC effect but
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when such S-R associations were eliminated a reliable LWPC was obtained. Similarly,
Hutchison (2011) varied the degree to which the word predicted the color response on
incongruent trials (high vs. low contingency) and showed that the LWPC effect was exaggerated
when the items within the list were also mostly congruent. Hutchison interpreted these results as
indicating the two mechanisms are not additive (benefits are the same whether one or both types
of control are operating but performance suffers greatly when both are missing).
In sum, the results of Experiment 3, and the review of the available literature, suggests
that although the LWPC and the ISPC (thought to reflect proactive and reactive control
respectively) interact with one another, the CSE appears largely additive with both. The primary
point of course is that the system or mechanism that produces the CSE appears to be independent
of other systems that modulate control processes.
General Discussion
There were three primary aims of this dissertation each regarding the nature of dynamic
attentional control adjustments in healthy aging. The first aim was to determine what stimuli
characteristics prompt adjustments in response dynamics, with primary focus devoted to
adjudicating between pathway priming, temporal learning and conflict monitoring accounts.
Second, how are these changes implemented within the cognitive system? More specifically,
what component of processing changes as a function of the preceding trial? Third, how do these
identified processes differ across healthy young and older adults?
Before turning to a discussion of these issues in detail, it is important to again note that
the current study implemented procedures that differ from standard methods currently in use in
the field. First, response and stimuli repetitions were experimentally controlled across adjacent
trials whereas the more standard approach is to simply remove repetition trials from the data
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before undertaking any analysis. Of course this comes with the limitation of producing a
relatively restricted stimulus set as well as introducing some degree of predictability to the trial
sequences. Second, three attention tasks were administered to the same group of individuals
allowing for careful analyses of cross-trial differences in multiple tasks. In the past, the vast
majority of studies of attentional control have made inferences across different paradigms each
with very different procedures. The methods employed here maximized the similarity across
tasks. Third, Experiments 1 and 2 were designed with the diffusion model in mind which, as
noted, allowed for inferences to be made on latent parameters that supposedly index underlying
cognitive processes. Unfortunately, this required a substantial increase in the number of trials
than might otherwise be administered, which may be particularly difficult for the older adult
population which might have an unknown influence on these results (i.e., it cannot be certain
how these effects change as a function of practice or fatigue for each age group). With these
caveats in mind, each of the primary results are discussed in the context of each of the major
aims.
Question 1: What is the trigger for control adjustment?
This question was approached in several different ways. First, in Experiment 1, a robust
CSE was found across three different interference tasks, Simon, Stroop and flanker. This result
is important in demonstrating that perceived conflict has a role to play in modulating cross-trial
response dynamics. Few studies to date have convincingly eliminated all potential confounds in
order to isolate the influence of the preceding trial to conflict adaptation per se (Duthoo et al.,
2014a). However, under the strict speed instructions in Experiment 2, the CSE in reaction times
was not as consistently found. Specifically, the CSE was only statistically reliable in the Simon
task but was clearly trending in the Stroop task as well (p = .099). Furthermore, the CSE did
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manifest on overall accuracy which also interacted with age. It is possible that the speed
instructions somehow eliminated the CSE in RT but the cross-experiment analysis was unable to
detect a reliable decrease in the CSE between Experiments 1 and 2 (p = .59). It is also possible
that the speed emphasis simply pushed the effects onto a different metric (i.e., accuracy rather
than RT).
Of course, in the first two experiments congruency was necessarily confounded with
pathway utility, the key mechanism hypothesized by the pathway priming model. That is, the
irrelevant dimension was useful on congruent trials which also have lower conflict than
incongruent trials. Thus, it cannot be determined from Experiments 1 and 2 precisely which
mechanism is responsible for the cross trial adjustments, although the age effects speak to this
issue (see discussion of Question 3 below).
Experiment 3 took a different approach to the conflict monitoring vs. pathway priming
question. In this Experiment, the conflict and contingencies across different Stroop stimuli was
jointly manipulated. Specifically, items were designed to either be mostly incongruent, mostly
congruent or 50% congruent. Based on the well-established finding of reduced interference to
mostly incongruent items (Bugg, 2012), it can be assumed that perceived conflict is lower for
these items and higher for the mostly congruent items. Furthermore, both of the ISPC
manipulations introduced a reliable S-R association that could be utilized to correctly respond to
those items. In other words, the irrelevant dimension was made useful on all trials, which under
the pathway priming framework should increase the CSE. Interestingly, in apparent contrast to
both the conflict monitoring and pathway priming accounts, the CSE was additive with the
previous item types which themselves produced a reliable ISPC. In other words, the differential
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interference produced by the various item types did not modulate the CSE. This suggests that the
CSE and ISPC index different levels of control (discussed further below).
Question 2: How are control adjustments implemented?
A second aim of this work was to understand how the cognitive processing system
implements cross-trial changes in control. This was addressed within the context of the Ratcliff
(1978) diffusion model. Three accounts of the CSE were formalized within terms of the diffusion
model parameters. The temporal learning account (Schmidt, 2013b) was most straightforwardly
cast within the diffusion framework. Specifically, this model argues that cross-trial adjustments
are strictly due to changes in response thresholds or response caution. This is noteworthy
because many prominent accounts of dynamic adjustments in processing, both within and
outside the cognitive control literature, assume a trial by trial change in response thresholds
(Kinoshita et al., 2008; Schmidt, 2013b; Taylor & Lupker, 2001). In the context of the current
tasks, this model would predict the previous congruency to produce a change in response
thresholds regardless of the type of interference that was experienced (i.e., regardless of the
task).
The pathway priming model suggested by Aschenbrenner and Balota (2015) proposes
that the utility of a given pathway (e.g., word pathway in Stroop) primes that pathway for further
use on the next trial. This suggests that evidence accumulation for the response associated with
that pathway should be more rapid than it would be otherwise. This process would then predict
an increase on the drift rate parameter regardless of the task.
Finally, the conflict monitoring hypothesis specifically predicts that conflict on prior
trials produces an up-regulation of control for the subsequent trial. This is particularly intriguing
from a diffusion model perspective given that the parameter that indexes control was expected to
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vary as a function of task. As outlined in the introduction, control over Simon interference
involves inhibition of a motor response code, reflected in the non-decision time parameter,
whereas control in the other two tasks should be modeled via differences in the drift rate. Thus,
under the conflict monitoring account, one would expect a task dissociation such that previous
trial influences manifest on the non-decision time parameter for Simon and drift rate for Stroop
and flanker.
Experiments 1 and 2 were explicitly designed to tease apart these different theoretical
perspectives. Although diffusion model analyses were precluded by the very high accuracy rates
in Experiment 1, the RT distributional analyses converged on several important points. First, and
most importantly, there were dissociations in the distributional signatures across the three tasks.
In the Simon task, the CSE manifested as a simple shifting of the RT distributions. Simulation
studies have shown that the largest changes in distributional shifting result from differences in
non-decision time, although other parameters can produce such a change as well (Matzke &
Wagenmakers, 2009). In contrast, the CSE resulted in changes in distributional skewing in the
Stroop task. Changes in skew can be associated with differences either in the drift rate or in the
boundary separation parameters but generally not with non-decision time. Thus, the shifting
pattern in the Simon task seems to speak against both the threshold adjustment account and the
pathway priming model. Of course, it should be noted that the pathway priming account was
developed only to account for Stroop performance and thus may not apply to Simon-type tasks.
The distributional data from the flanker task were a little noisier and indeed there was a
small interaction to suggest that the distributional signature of the CSE differed between younger
and older adults in this task. However, follow-up analyses of this interaction revealed additive
effects among current congruency, previous congruency and quantile for both age groups.
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Furthermore, the interaction with age group was not replicated in the second experiment and
thus, the CSE in the flanker task also seems best described by shifting of the distribution.
Making inferences about components of processing based solely on distributional
characteristics can be problematic (Matzke & Wagenmakers, 2009) and thus a full diffusion
model was applied to the data from Experiment 2. Unfortunately, these analyses did not find a
reliable CSE in the model parameters across tasks. Specifically, in none of the tasks did the
boundary separation parameter vary as a function of the congruency of the previous trial and
only the Simon task showed an effect of current trial congruency on this parameter. The only
task that showed the predicted interaction was the Simon task. Here the interaction manifested on
both non-decision time and the drift rate, broadly consistent with the conflict monitoring
account. Of course, the null effects in the other tasks raises concerns about the generality of these
findings to other paradigms.
Question 3: Dynamic control and aging
The final primary aim of this work was to understand whether and how the influence of
healthy aging changes the CSE across tasks. The literature to date on this topic has been fairly
equivocal with most studies finding null effects (Puccioni & Vallesi, 2012; West & Moore,
2005) and one finding significant increases in this effect with age (Aschenbrenner & Balota,
2015). Although the statistical significance varies across the studies, it is important to note that in
the available literature all studies used the Stroop task to investigate age-related changes in
conflict adaptation and uniformly found numerical increases in the CSE as a function of age,
even after accounting for general slowing. Hence, a primary goal of the present study was to
further explore the CSE across age groups and to extend prior Stroop findings to additional
attentional control paradigms.
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In Experiment 1, the results from the linear mixed effects modeling indicated that the
CSE was clearly modulated by age in two different tasks. It is important to again point out that
cross-trial repetitions and contingencies were carefully controlled and thus cannot be a confound
in these results. Interestingly, and as expected, the age by CSE interaction manifested in opposite
directions across the two tasks. In the Stroop paradigm, older adults exhibited a larger CSE effect
which was driven to a large extent by differences on post-congruent trials, replicating prior
findings. In contrast, older adults showed a smaller CSE in the Simon task, due primarily to
differences on post-incongruent trials. Similar trends were shown in the flanker task (i.e., smaller
CSEs in older adults). As discussed above, these differences were further examined via RT
distributional analyses. These results showed that the shape of the distribution changed across
age in the Stroop and flanker tasks but resulted in shifting for both groups in Simon, just to a
lesser extent for the older adults.
Surprisingly few age effects were reliable in Experiment 3. Specifically, older adults
showed a proportionally equivalent CSE as the younger adults, and at least in this design, also
exhibited an equivalent CSE overall. As noted below, this task has some additional limitations
that may have given rise to these null relationships.
One of the most striking findings from this work is the cross over interaction between age
and the CSE across tasks (larger for older adults in Stroop but smaller in Simon and flanker).
This suggests that unique attentional control mechanisms are operating in each task. It is possible
that standard conflict adaptation processes are in play in Simon and flanker but due to the unique
nature of Stroop stimuli, these adaptation effects are masked by increased priming of irrelevant
pathways.
Limitations
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There are of course a few limitations to this study that should be noted. First, the tasks
were quite long with each experiment including anywhere from 600-1200 trials, and lasting
between one and two hours. This longer than normal length might contribute to group
differences in the CSE. For example, Mayr and Awh (2009) show relatively little CSE occurs
after the first 176 trials in an experiment. Although there was a reliable CSE even at these trial
numbers, length could be interacting in as yet unknown ways. An analysis of the first vs. second
half of trials revealed no evidence of differing patterns of the CSE in these data which helps
alleviate this concern. However, it should also be noted that there were significant interactions
between “trial” and age in each task. The direction was such that older adults speed up more
across trials than younger adults. This might reflect the fact that older adults simply need more
time to become accustomed to the particular task demands.
An additional limitation pertains to the diffusion model analysis. Specifically, in order to
obtain a large enough number of errors to be amenable to modeling in Experiment 2, participants
were placed under a response deadline. This presents a substantial departure from how
interference tasks are typically conducted. As noted, the CSEs in the mean RTs were relatively
similar across the experiments but the distributional characteristics were must less robust. Future
work should endeavor to develop a task that can produce a substantial number of errors within
the constraints of normal task instructions (e.g., go as quickly as you can while minimizing
errors). Furthermore, because there were four alternatives in this design and the diffusion model
can only accommodate two alternatives, I had to implement “accuracy coding” in the model.
This assumes that the distributions of each response (e.g., RED, BLUE, GREEN and YELLOW
in the Stroop task) all have similar shapes and scale. Future work should apply a model
specifically designed to handle multiple alternatives such as the Linear Ballistic Accumulator
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(Brown & Heathcote, 2008). Finally, the locus of interference (i.e., the congruency effect)
manifested on multiple model parameters instead of the single parameter suggest by each of the
task models. This might suggest that either the diffusion model is not capable of adequately
capturing the data from these types of tasks or that the task models need to be further
embellished to allow for effects on multiple parameters. This cannot be determined from the
present data.
Conclusions
The present dissertation has revealed several findings regarding the nature of dynamic
adjustments in control processes, particularly as a function of healthy aging. First, the CSE is a
reliable, control-based phenomenon that is initiated based on the presence of conflict and is not
due to other confounds. This was demonstrated by the consistent CSE across all tasks and all
experiments which controlled for cross-trial repetition and contingency confounds. Furthermore,
the ability to actively initiate cross-trial adjustments declines in age as evidenced by the smaller
CSEs for older adults in both Simon and flanker tasks. The larger effects for older adults in the
Stroop task were attributed to a priming mechanism by which the utility of irrelevant information
primes the associated pathway for the subsequent trial. Older adults exhibit a decline in the
ability to control this priming leading to larger effects in this task. Although not directly tested, it
was speculated that the priming mechanism is engaged when the conflicting attributes are
perceived as a single, integrated whole as is the case in Stroop. This can be further tested by
spatially separating the color and word dimensions (see Spieler et al. 2000) and see if the CSE
then reverses again as a function of age (i.e., becomes smaller in older adults).
Finally, the adaptation system that underlies cross-trial changes appears to be additive
with other, top-down control mechanisms as shown in Experiment 3. One account for this is that
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the ISPC occurs at the level of individual items. For example, the word GREEN is frequently
incongruent so control can be reactively increased to resolve that interference, again only for that
item. Retrieved control settings would not carry over to the next trial because that new trial
would involve retrieval of its own control setting.
The CSE then reflects an insular and independent system that operates at a more global
level of control but initiated by characteristics that manifest at the trial level. Specifically, on
any given trial congruent stimuli carry some utility of the irrelevant dimension which can then
persist into the next trial. This priming may be automatic and independent from higher order,
memory retrieval processes (i.e., retrieval of S-R associations). This system appears to be
automatically engaged and is not differentially modulated by overall conflict or overall utility.
Importantly, the operations that occur as a result of this automatic process (e.g., an increase in
top-down control) declines with age consistent with age-related changes in global attentional
control processes which was shown most strongly in Experiment 1.
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Appendix A.
Individual level interference scores (incongruent RT – congruent RT) and CSE (postincongruent interference minus post-congruent interference) were calculated for each task in
Experiment 1. These scores were then correlated with each other as well as the working memory
capacity score. These correlations were collapsed across age group. As shown, there is little
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systematic relationships among the variables and in some cases goes in opposite the predicted
direction (for example, working memory and the CSE in Stroop).
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Table 26. Correlations between interference in each task, the CSE in each task and working memory span.

Span
Simon
Interference
Stroop
Interference
Simon CSE
Stroop CSE

r
p-value
r
p-value
r
p-value
r
p-value
r
p-value

Simon
-0.05
0.669

Interference
Stroop
0.014
0.911
0.218
0.06
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Flanker
-0.2
0.094
-0.009
0.941
0.11
0.33

Simon
-0.07
0.54
-0.18
0.12
0.11
0.35

CSE
Stroop
0.19
0.111
0.12
0.3
-0.15
0.19
-0.013
0.912

Flanker
-0.16
0.18
0.04
0.75
0.02
0.89
0.16
0.18
-0.03
0.83

Appendix B
Individual level interference scores (incongruent RT – congruent RT) and CSE (postincongruent interference minus post-congruent interference) were calculated for each task in
Experiment 2. These scores were then correlated with each other as well as the working memory
capacity score (measured using the computation span task), processing speed (measured with the
speeded consonant-vowel, odd-even task) and attentional control (measured as incongruent –
congruent RT in a standard Stroop microphone task). These correlations were collapsed across
age group. As shown, there are little systematic relationships among the variables with the
exceptions noted in the text.
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Table 27. Correlations between interference in each task, the CSE in each task and working
memory span, processing speed and attentional control in Experiment 2.

Span

r
p-value
Processing Speed
r
p-value
Attentional Control r
p-value
r
Simon Interference
p-value
r
Stroop Interference
p-value
r
Simon CSE
p-value
r
Stroop CSE
p-value

Interference
CSE
Simon Stroop Flanker Simon Stroop Flanker
-0.164 -0.191 0.015 0.126 0.152 -0.061
0.182 0.119 0.904 0.307 0.216 0.624
0.188 0.348 -0.302 0.025 -0.106
0.37
0.118 0.003 0.792 0.837
0.38
0.002
0.189 0.585 0.053
0.093
-0.05 -0.11
0.115 < .001 0.659 0.678
0.36
0.441
0.424 0.336 0.022 -0.089 0.058
< .001 0.004 0.857 0.461 0.632
0.24
-0.08 -0.072 0.073
0.044 0.508 0.553 0.547
-0.241 -0.071
0.043 0.554
0.089
0.463
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Figure 23. Significant correlations between interference and CSE in the 3 primary tasks of Experiment
2.
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Figure 24. Scatterplots of significant correlations between individual difference measures and
interference or the CSE of the 3 primary tasks in Experiment 2

.
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Appendix C.
Table 28. Mean (SD) of percentage of trials trimmed in each condition in Experiment 3.
Critical CSE Items
Biased Items
MC List
MC Items
CC
CI
IC
II
Congruent Incongruent
Younger Adults .06 (.04) .07 (.05) .12 (.08) .11 (.07) .07 (.03)
.07 (.05)
Older Adults
.04 (.04) .06 (.05) .09 (.06) .10 (.06) .06 (.04)
.09 (.06)
MI List
MI Items
CC
CI
IC
II
Congruent Incongruent
Younger Adults .06 (.05) .05 (.04) .06 (.05) .08 (.06) .05 (.03)
.08 (.03)
Older Adults
.06 (.05) .06 (.05) .05 (.04) .07 (.06) .07 (.04)
.07 (.03)
Neutral List
Neutral Items
CC
CI
IC
II
Congruent Incongruent
Younger Adults .06 (.06) .06 (.05) .10 (.08) .10 (.08) .07 (.04)
.07 (.04)
Older Adults
.04 (.04) .05 (.05) .07 (.06) .09 (.06)
.06 (03)
.08 (.03)
Note: CC = Congruent-congruent sequences, CI = congruent-incongruent sequences, IC =
incongruent-congruent, II = incongruent-incongruent.

Percentages were submitted to a 2 (group) by 2 (previous trial congruency) by 2 (current
trial congruency by 3 (previous list type) ANOVA for the critical CSE items and a 2 (group) by 2
(congruency) by 3 (current list type) ANOVA for the biased items. It should be noted that
because post-error trials were trimmed from analysis (in order to avoid post-error slowing
confounds, wherever there is an effect on accuracy there is likely to be an effect on percentage
trials trimmed as well.
For the critical items, the main effects of previous congruency, current congruency, list
type, the previous congruency by list type interaction and the previous congruency by current
congruency by list type interaction were all significant at the p < .05 level. There were no
significant interactions with age group. For the biased items, there was a significant congruency
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by list interaction and a congruency by age group interaction (p = .034). Again these trimming
differences are closely related to overall accuracy rates.
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Appendix D.
Raw and z-scored RTs for each experiment and the associated significance tests from
ANOVA in Experiment 3.
Table 29. Experiment 1 Raw RT (Standard Deviations).

Younger adults

Older adults
Simon Task

Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE

Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE

PC
577 (90)
666(100)
89

PI
595 (90)
661(100)
66

Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE
Stroop Task

-23
PC
643 (98)
712 (129)
69

PI
643 (99)
703 (122)
60

Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE
Flanker Task

-9
PC
717 (127)
785 (138)
68

PC
PI
908(14)
920(211)
1016(206) 1017(206)
108
97
-11
PC
PI
1158 (288) 1170 (295)
1329 (296) 1293 (274)
171
123
-48

PI
PC
PI
Congruent
725 (126)
Congruent
1157 (284) 1170 (289)
Incongruent
765 (128)
Incongruent 1224 (293) 1216 (299)
SI
40
SI
67
46
CSE
-28
CSE
-21
Note: PC = Previous congruent trial, PI = previous incongruent trial, SI = interference, CSE =
congruency sequence effect
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Table 30. ANOVA statistics for Raw RTs in Experiment 1.
Simon Task
Effect

Stroop Task

Flanker Task

DFn

DFd

F

p-value

DFd

F

p-value

DFd

F

p-value

Age

1

74

88.17

< .01

74

135.00

< .01

73

76.65

< .01

PC

1

74

10.71

< .01

74

9.01

< .01

73

.55

.46

C

1

74

357.80

< .01

74

160.37

< .01

73

196.96

< .01

Age * PC

1

74

0.01

.93

74

1.89

.17

73

3.73

.06

Age * C

1

74

7.22

< .01

74

24.11

< .01

73

.10

.75

CSE

1

74

20.38

< .01

74

20.61

< .01

73

16.95

< .01

Age * CSE

1

74

2.17

.15

74

9.06

< .01

73

.43

.52

Note: PC = previous trial congruency, C = current trial congruency, CSE = C by PC interaction.
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Table 31. Means (SDs) of z-scored RTs for each task in Experiment 1.

Younger adults

Older adults
Simon Task

Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE

PC
PI
-.372(.139) -.226 (.112)
0.338(.159) 0.299(.103)
0.71
0.525
-0.185

Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE

PC
PI
-.314 (.152) -.235 (.161)
0.279 (.171) .283 (.147)
0.593
0.518
-0.075

Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE

PC
PI
-.248 (.160) -.217 (.165)
.287 (.160)
.193 (.188)
0.535
0.41
-0.125

Stroop Task
Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE

PC
-.191 (.131)
.226 (.142)
0.417
-0.051

PI
-.194 (.130)
.172 (.142)
0.366
Flanker Task

PC
PI
PC
PI
Congruent
-.197 (.132) -.145 (.102)
Congruent
-.139 (.088) -.087 (.867)
Incongruent
.235 (.135)
.110 (.098)
Incongruent
.129 (.093)
.1 (.114)
SI
0.432
0.255
SI
0.268
0.187
CSE
-0.177
CSE
-0.081
Note: PC = Previous congruent trial, PI = previous incongruent trial, SI = interference, CSE =
congruency sequence effect.
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Table 32. ANOVA statistics for the z-scored RTs in Experiment 1.
Simon Task
Effect

Stroop Task

Flanker Task

DFn

DFd

F

p-value

DFd

F

p-value

DFd

F

p-value

Age

1

74

8.78

< .01

74

.23

.63

73

.00

.99

PC

1

74

14.87

< .01

74

9.18

< .01

73

1.68

.20

C

1

74

422. 80

< .01

74

189.64

< .01

73

214.53

< .01

Age * PC

1

74

.29

.59

74

.03

.86

73

6.28

.01

Age * C

1

74

1.18

.28

74

1.65

.20

73

8.81

< .01

CSE

1

74

32.65

< .01

74

13.92

< .01

73

26.60

< .01

Age * CSE

1

74

5.63

.02

74

2.46

.12

73

3.68

.06

Note: PC = previous trial congruency, C = current trial congruency, CSE = C by PC interaction.
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Table 33. Mean (SD) of the Raw RTs for each task in Experiment 2.

Younger adults

Older adults
Simon Task

Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE

PC
490 (58)
573 (60)
83

PI
511 (64)
565 (60)
54

Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE

-29

PC
741 (110)
845 (115)
104

PI
757 (110)
840 (108)
83
-21

Stroop Task
Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE

PC
541 (75)
588 (98)
47

PI
543 (78)
588 (94)
45

Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE

-2

PC
PI
938 (212)
940 (216)
1099 (242) 1079 (244)
161
139
-22

Flanker Task
PC
622 (96)
673 (97)
51

PI
PC
PI
Congruent
628 (98)
Congruent
967 (167)
956 (168)
Incongruent
667 (94)
Incongruent 1006 (160) 1005 (164)
SI
39
SI
39
49
CSE
-12
CSE
10
Note: PC = Previous congruent trial, PI = previous incongruent trial, SI = interference, CSE =
congruency sequence effect.
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Table 34. ANOVA statistics for the Raw RTs in Experiment 2.
Simon Task
Effect
Age

Stroop Task

DFn

DFd

F

p-value

1

69

161.50

< .01

DFd
69

F

p-value

128.16

Flanker Task
F

p-value

< .01

DFd
69

114.90

< .01

1.12

.29

69

1.16

.29

PC

1

69

12.05

< .01

69

C

1

69

433.48

< .01

69

124.78

< .01

69

149.24

< .01

Age * PC

1

69

.17

.69

69

1.66

.20

69

.96

.33

Age * C

1

69

10.48

< .01

69

35.52

< .01

69

.01

.91

CSE

1

69

37.19

< .01

69

4.55

.04

69

.01

.12

Age * CSE

1

69

.96

.33

69

3.03

.09

69

2.49

.12

Note: PC = previous trial congruency, C = current trial congruency, CSE = C by PC interaction.
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Table 35. Means (SDs) of the z-scored RTs for each task in Experiment 2.

Younger adults

Older adults
Simon Task

Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE

PC
PI
-.48 (.145) -.249 (.204)
.478 (.172) .401 (.196)
0.958
0.65
-0.308

Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE

PC
PI
-.452 (.196) -.306 (.150)
.402 (.157) .371 (.173)
0.854
0.677
-0.177

Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE

PC
PI
-.332 (.167) -.319 (.193)
.394 (.210) .297 (.181)
0.726
0.616
-0.11

Stroop Task
Congruent
Incongruent
SI
CSE

PC
PI
-.188 (.192) -.174 (.136)
.199 (.189) .202 (.191)
0.387
0.376
-0.011
Flanker Task

PC
PI
PC
PI
Congruent
-.210 (.171) -.169 (.163)
Congruent
-.10 (.151) -.166 (.159)
Incongruent
.215 (.146) .179 (.174)
Incongruent
.131 (.14)
.135 (.134)
SI
0.425
0.348
SI
0.231
0.301
CSE
-0.077
CSE
0.07
Note: PC = Previous congruent trial, PI = previous incongruent trial, SI = interference, CSE =
congruency sequence effect.
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Table 36. ANOVA statistics for the z-scored RTs for each task in Experiment 2.
Simon Task
Effect
Age

Stroop Task

DFn

DFd

F

p-value

1

69

21.34

< .01

DFd
69

F

p-value

.00

Flanker Task
F

p-value

.96

DFd
69

.97

.33

.83

.37

69

.55

.46

PC

1

69

17.63

< .01

69

C

1

69

574.92

< .01

69

224.59

< .01

69

162.47

< .01

Age * PC

1

69

.37

.54

69

1.93

.17

69

.72

.40

Age * C

1

69

.36

.55

69

16.97

< .01

69

5.61

.02

CSE

1

69

41.57

< .01

69

2.98

.09

69

.01

.93

Age * CSE

1

69

3.05

.09

69

1.95

.17

69

4.28

.04

Note: PC = previous trial congruency, C = current trial congruency, CSE = C by PC interaction.
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Table 37. Mean (SD) of the raw RTs for the critical CSE items in Experiment 3.
Younger Adults
MC
C
I
SI
CSE

C
I
SI
CSE

PC
PI
596 (88)
620 (88)
695 (109) 702 (105)
99
82
-17

MI
C
I
SI
CSE

PC
PI
596 (90)
615 (85)
692 (107) 698 (112)
96
83
-13
Older Adults

Neutral
C
I
SI
CSE

PC
PI
598 (86)
613 (90)
690 (110) 694 (107)
92
81
-11

MC

MI

Neutral

PC
PI
715 (112) 718 (106)
855 (138) 837 (133)
140
119
-21

PC
PI
698 (106) 724 (106)
847 (155) 844 (137)
149
120
-29

PC
PI
697 (90) 728 (105)
838 (142) 845 (140)
141
117
-24

C
I
SI
CSE

C
I
SI
CSE

Note: MC = mostly congruent items, MI = mostly incongruent items, Neutral = unbiased items,
PC = previous congruent trial, PI = previous incongruent trial, SI = Stroop interference, CSE =
congruency sequence effect.
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Table 38. ANOVA statistics of Raw RTs for the critical CSE items in Experiment 3.
Effect
DFn
DFd
F
p-value
Age
1
62
23.54
< .01
PC
1
62
19.64
< .01
C
1
62
248.19
< .01
List
2
124
1.35
.26
C * PC
1
62
26.13
< .001
PC * Age
1
62
1.23
.27
C * Age
1
62
9.07
< .01
List * Age
2
124
.01
.99
PC * list
2
124
3.01
.05
C * list
2
124
.35
.71
PC * C * Age
1
62
1.92
.17
PC * List * Age
2
124
7.94
< .01
C * List * Age
2
124
.13
.88
PC * C * List
2
124
.16
.86
PC * C * List * Age
2
124
.27
.76
Note. PC = previous trial congruency, C = current trial congruency, List = previous item type
(MC, MI or Neutral).
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Table 39. Mean (SD) z-scored RT for the critical CSE items in Experiment 3.
Younger Adults

C
I
SI
CSE

MC

MI

Neutral

PC
PI
-.417 (.171)
-.224 (.230)
.360 (.244)
.408 (.158)
0.777
0.632
-0.145

PC
PI
-.441 (.188)
-.264 (.236)
.324 (.190)
.366 (.191)
0.765
0.102
-0.663

PC
PI
-.402 (.174)
-.278 (.181)
.327 (.257)
.348 (.20)
0.729
0.626
-0.103

C
I
SI
CSE

C
I
SI
CSE

Older Adults
MC
C
I
SI
CSE

PC
-.402 (.202)
.482 (.187)
0.884

MI
PI
-.355 (.198)
.368 (.202)
0.723

-0.161

C
I
SI

PC
-.495 (.192)
.431 (.272)
0.926

CSE

Neutral
PI
-.336 (.176)
.418 (.243)
0.754

-0.172

C
I
SI
CSE

PC
-.495 (.187)
.371 (.224)
0.866

-0.117

Note: MC = mostly congruent items, MI = mostly incongruent items, Neutral = unbiased items,
PC = previous congruent trial, PI = previous incongruent trial, SI = Stroop interference, CSE =
congruency sequence effect.
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PI
-.322 (.207)
.427 (.250)
0.749

Table 40. ANOVA statistics of the z-scored RTs of the critical CSE items in Experiment 3.
Effect
DFn
DFd
F
p-value
Age
1
62
.22
.64
PC
1
62
27.67
< .001
C
1
62
536.49
< .001
List
2
124
1.83
.17
C * PC
1
62
31.08
< .001
PC * Age
1
62
2.93
.09
C * Age
1
62
3.60
.063
List * Age
2
124
.124
.884
PC * list
2
124
1.80
.169
C * list
2
124
.356
.701
PC * C * Age
1
62
.206
.652
PC * List * Age
2
124
5.56
.005
C * List * Age
2
124
.261
.77
PC * C * List
2
124
.376
.687
PC * C * List * Age
2
124
.03
.97
Note. PC = previous trial congruency, C = current trial congruency, List = previous item type
(MC, MI or Neutral).
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